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Abstract
Decision making is a fundamental part of human life. Evidence from psy-
chology, economics and more recently neuroscience, is providing new depths
of understanding, from perceptual information acquisition to the e↵ects of
making decisions in social groups. This thesis uses a value based decision
framework and incentive compatible experiments commonly found in experi-
mental and behavioral economics to examine the e↵ects of social phenomena
on decision making. This makes use of current behavioral modeling methods
to test the e↵ects of other-perspective taking (mentalizing) and social norms
on value based decisions.
In the first study, the value computations that take place in strategic
social contexts were investigated where there was possibility of retribution
for norm violations. Here, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to show that when human subjects face such a context connectiv-
ity increases between the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), implicated in the
representation of other peoples thoughts and intentions, and regions of ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that are associated with value com-
putation. In contrast, we found no increase in connectivity between these
regions in social nonstrategic cases where decision-makers are immune from
retributive monetary punishments from a human partner. Moreover, there
was also no increase in TPJ-vmPFC connectivity when the potential pun-
ishment was performed by a computer programmed to punish fairness norm
violations in the same manner as a human would. Thus, TPJ-vmPFC con-
nectivity is not simply a function of the social or norm enforcing nature of
the decision, but rather occurs specifically in situations where subjects make
decisions in a social context and strategically consider putative consequences
imposed by others.
In the second study, the e↵ects of social norms were investigated by ap-
plying the drift di↵usion model (DDM) behavioral data from a modified ul-
timatum game that explored the e↵ect of the social norm of fairness. It was
found that the relative value of these decisions (as modeled in the DDM)
could be influenced by focusing on the fairness or money in the decision.
These decisions took place while the human subjects were undergoing fMRI
scanning and the relative value correlated with large areas of medial frontal
cortex. Given previous evidence showing the importance of these areas in
value computations, it appears that the DDM is able to e↵ectively infer the
value of the choices we presented. Further investigation revealed that the
behavior was also reflected in some brain regions, with accepting unfair of-
fers being associated with more activity in the anterior insula, while rejecting
these unfair o↵ers led to more activity in the TPJ. As such, it appears that
di↵erent brain areas are involved with di↵erent behavior in the ultimatum
game. Taken together, we show that the DDM is able to provide a good
proxy for relative decision value across di↵erent behavior and in di↵erent
contexts.
In the third study, the neural traces of value during purchase decisions
was explored, examining common and distinct patterns between charitable
and product decisions. These decisions were broken down into the willing-
ness to pay and the price of a purchase and an integrated measure of choice
value that depended on whether the option was chosen or not. This fMRI
experiment also made use of a multivariate approach to examine patterns
of activity in local areas of the brain. Testing where choice dependent inte-
grated values were distinct between charity and product decisions revealed
the dmPFC as discriminating value correlations between the two conditions.
In addition to this choice dependant form of value, the di↵erent attributes of
the purchase decision were also tested across local areas of the brain. These
simple attributes were not seen to di↵er between charity and product pur-
chase decisions. On the other hand, common encoding patterns appear to
distinguish between the two attributes in the lateral prefrontal cortex and
dorsal anterior cingulated. Thus, di↵erent areas of the brain encode di↵er-
ent aspects of the decision, the choice dependent valuation being di↵erent
across condition, but the simple value attributes as being common across the
decision contexts.
In summary, the findings of these experiments emphasize the importance
of social context in value based decision making. They hint at both com-
mon and distinct mechanisms that underlie these conditions and may help
guide future research in making social contexts more amenable to economic
analysis.
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Chapter 1
General introduction
For humans, decision making is a fundamental part of living. As social ani-
mals, much of the decision making that humans are engaged in takes place
in a social environment. This social context may be considered as being a
variable that other decision variables are conditioned upon another example
would be the contextual e↵ect of the weather a↵ecting the prospective enjoy-
ment derived from outdoor vs. indoor activities. However, there appears to
be something special about this social context. The high degree of sociability
of humans and the complexity of the social environment combined with the
apparent ease of integrating social information suggests that there may be
structural qualities of the mind specially related to encoding social e↵ects.
This thesis explores some of these social e↵ects on value based decision mak-
ing by observing the human brain and behavior during decisions relating to
social norms and value.
1.1 Social norms
One of the great questions in studying human behavior lies in understanding
the nature of social norms. In general, normative behavior can assign value
to an outcome without necessarily relying on self-interested utility calcula-
tions. For example, many people hold the moral norm that there is a value
in the ethical treatment of animals, even when there is no direct benefit to
themselves. Similarly, social norms can be seen as providing a similar form
of value assignment in a social context. This is particularly evident in the
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case of charitable donation, where giving anonymously to others may be done
because it is considered to be simply the right thing to do. However, deciding
the amount requires a form of value judgment. One way of formalizing char-
itable giving is by using an economic game known as the dictator game. In
the standard variant of this game, two people take part, where one is given
money and the opportunity to split it with the other player if they wish to
(Kahneman et al. 1986). Even when steps are taken to anonymise the players
and raise the stakes, players often share some of the money and even split
the money equally in some cases. In this case, it appears that a social norm
of fairness is influencing the choice behavior. The amount of influence this
norm exerts can be calculated by examining how much money is given up
in order to make the split more fair. Experimental evidence suggests that
most people do give something, with fewer people giving larger fractions of
the initial endowment, indicative of a trade o↵ between the money that they
keep and the value of a fair outcome (C. Camerer 2003). It should also be
noted that the decreasing trend does not hold at the fairest split of 50%,
suggesting that the value of social norms can be subject to heuristic judg-
ment (Bos et al. 1997). Interestingly, the application of social norms to value
decisions also appears to be subject to the context of the decision and the
available actions (List 2007).
1.2 Strategic play
In addition to the impact social norms have on simple valuation, they can
also shape the environment in which we make decisions. This is because in
many cases, the results of our own actions depend on the actions of other
people which may be governed by social norms. An example of this derives
from a simple extension of the dictator game, known as the ultimatum game
(Gth et al. 1982). This follows the same steps as the dictator game on the
part of the person making the split. However, in the ultimatum game, the
person who was a passive receiver can now decide to reject the split in which
case the money is taken away from both players, or accept the split with the
same result as if they were playing in the dictator game. In the absence of
social norms, we might expect the receiver to accept anything as being better
than nothing, but if they put a value on fairness, then they may decide to
sacrifice their money in order to ensure a fair outcome where neither player
receives anything. The more value they put on fairness, the more they would
need before they accept a split. If the person deciding on the split believes
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this to be the case, then they should take the other persons social norms into
account when deciding how much to give in a strategic manner. Experimental
evidence shows that recievers do reject unfair splits, even when they stand to
lose money and people deciding the split apparently take this into account
and make more fair o↵ers. Although it has been suggested that this behavior
follows from an irrational emotional response (Koenigs and Tranel 2007), the
proportion of rejections decreases as more is o↵ered (C. Camerer 2003). This
suggests that in a value based framework, the enforcement and conformity
of social norms may better explain the e↵ects of social norms on human
behavior.
1.3 Social contexts
One of the challenges in using a value based framework to understand social
norms is that there are rarely objective measures of value. Most valuations
are learnt from external stimuli by individuals, meaning that the value of
an individual decision depends on the person making it and the situation
that they find themselves in. An approach that has found much success in
economics in to get people to reveal their preferences through the choices
that they make (Samuelson 1938). However, in cases such as social contexts,
the way that preferences are expressed may be di↵erent depending on the
particular circumstance. For example, at the supermarket checkout, a person
pushing into the queue may cause those who were already in line to punish the
one who has pushed in. On the other hand, if there is someone behind in the
queue with very few items, that person may even be invited to push in. Thus,
the deployment of social norms may have radically di↵erent e↵ects depending
on the situation. Making inferences relating to these internal mechanisms
from behavioral observation as in the case of a revealed preference can be
di cult because the observations underdetermine the potential causes of the
behavior. Ideally, a direct measure of an individuals value would provide
a more firm basis for inferring the e↵ects of social norms within a value
based framework. In recent years, great progress has been made in relating
the biological processes in the brain to behavior and the cognitive processes
that may be driving it. Current research on neural correlates of value and
environmental conditions that a↵ect valuations in the field of neuroeconomics
has proved fruitful. This research can guide our understanding of internal
mechanisms that underpin behavior by showing whether a given hypothesis
is supported by correlates in the brain.
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1.4 Neural correlates of value
Some of the foundational work on a neural relationships between the brain
and value based decision making came from the psychological research into
reinforcement learning. This took work from Pavlov (Pavlov (1927) 2010)
and tried to explain some variations on the original experiments such as oper-
ant conditioning (Skinner 1938) via a model of predicted outcomes compared
to realized outcomes (Rescorla and Wagner 1972; Sutton and Barto 1998). In
these models, a prediction error provides a signal for learning the structure
of the world. During a learning experiment where macaque striatal neurons
were recorded (Schultz 1998), it was found that firing patterns directly re-
lating to this prediction error signal were present in dopaminergic neurons.
Further experimentation has revealed that these results may even explain
some discrepancies in the behavioral results from the theory, for example be-
tween losses and gains (Glimcher et al. 2008). Part of the power of this error
signal is that it can relate to a general representation of expected value, ren-
dering it amenable to economic questions. While these are normally framed
in complex environments for humans, the advent of functional magnetic res-
onance imaging (fMRI) has allowed for the non-invasive measurement of the
blood oxygen level dependant (BOLD) signal which may be considered as an
indirect measure of neural activity. For example, an experiment examining
simple purchasing choices found that the human equivalent of the striatum
found in macaques, related to the prediction error signal (Knutson et al.
2007).
1.5 neural correlates of decision models
Prediction error is not the only model parameter that can be tracked and
tested against neural correlates. For example, in a choice between two op-
tions, the drift di↵usion model (DDM) takes the evidence in favor of each
option and lets them compete against each other until a threshold is reached,
whereupon a decision is made. This has proved very successful in capturing
behavioral outcomes in perception tasks (Ratcli↵ and McKoon 2008) and
more recently has been applied to value based decisions in di↵erent domains
as well (Krajbich et al. 2015). The overall evidence in favor of an option
and the evidence threshold have both been found to have neural correlates
using a combined electroencephalographic (EEG) and fMRI experiment in a
reinforcement learning setting (Frank et al. 2015). This modeling approach
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captures the decision process itself as opposed to the feedback required in
prediction error models. It can also be augmented to test the e↵ects of ex-
perimentally manipulated variables (Polana et al. 2015) in order to capture
the e↵ects of di↵erent external conditions. In addition to the relative value of
the decision options, tracking neural correlates may be used to examine the
attributes that make up the value of an option. It has been shown that value
representations that are made up from multiple attributes seem to be able to
have those di↵erent attributes encoded in separate areas of the brain (Hare
et al. 2009; Lebreton et al. 2009). However, there still appears to be a single
area of the brain in ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that integrates
these attributes into a single value (Lim et al. 2013). This structure of value
formulation is important as it suggests that the integrated value of a choice
may have a modular nature. In turn, this may yield parsimonious models of
incorporating contextual information such as social norms into value based
decision making.
1.6 The social brain
While the neural support for value based decision making may explain some
social behaviors, there remains the question of how the social information is
encoded in the first place. The precise nature of this social information is dif-
ficult to define, however one important function is the ability to understand
the existence of other minds and be able to infer mental states from their
actions. The study of this theory of mind (ToM) has shown that this ability
develops in humans around the age of three to four years (Wellman et al.
2001). The universality of this human faculty suggests that there is a phys-
iological basis, and indeed, recent work has shown a “mentalizing network
of brain regions that are reliably activated during tasks where humans are
asked to consider other peoples thoughts (Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009).
Some areas of this network overlap with those often associated with value
based decision making such as medial frontal cortex, while others appear to
be more unique to the social information such as temporal parietal junction
(TPJ) and superior temporal sulcus (STS). Recent work has shown that dif-
ferent elements of ToM seem to be related to these di↵erent regions, with
information relating to value such as the confidence in social information be-
ing encoded in medial frontal cortex (Martino et al. 2017). It appears that
this region may also be involved in emotional value in a social context, how-
ever, information about building beliefs about other minds being associated
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with TPJ (Koster-Hale et al. 2017). In addition, charitable decisions appear
to access this network in a similar way with social information being encoded
in the TPJ and this region being coupled with the vmPFC when deciding
donations (Hare et al. 2010). This evidence may provide an explanation for
how information relating to social norms is integrated into value based deci-
sion making. On this view, the social information of others motivations and
mental states encoded in the TPJ could be integrated with the understand-
ing of social norms in order to provide an assessment of option value to the
vmPFC. This thesis seeks to examine these e↵ects over the course of three
value based decision making fMRI experiments. These explore strategic play
in a social norm compliance environment, the decision making process in
fairness contexts and the similarities and di↵erences in value representations
during charitable and personal choices.
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Chapter 2
Overview of studies
2.1 Study 1
Background
Social norm compliance is a key part of human sociality, where the ap-
plicability of a social norm must be considered to avoid peer punishment
for norm violations. This requires taking your own actions and the likely
reactions of other people into account. However, the way that value compu-
tations function in these contexts is poorly understood. As a central com-
ponent of the brains decision circuitry, the vmPFC has been associated with
value computation in non-strategic decision contexts ranging from primary
to social rewards for both self and others (Nicolle et al. 2012; Bartra et al.
2013; Clithero and Rangel 2014) and in choices during competitive games
(Hampton et al. 2008; Zhu et al. 2012). In addition, vmPFC lesions have
been shown to alter choice behavior under strategic conditions where norm
violations can result in retributive punishment (Krajbich et al. 2009). Col-
lectively, these data suggest that vmPFC might compute subjective values
in strategic social choices that require balancing personal preferences with
predictions about how the reactions of others to norm violations will impact
outcomes for self.
Previous research has shown that inferring another persons beliefs in or-
der to estimate his probable future actions recruits neural circuits including
the TPJ (Saxe and Wexler 2005; Frith and Frith 2006; Zhu et al. 2012).
Moreover, studies on competitive and cooperative interpersonal games sug-
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gest that TPJ encodes information about other players that could be used to
guide choices (Behrens et al. 2008; Hampton et al. 2008; Coricelli and Nagel
2009; Bhatt et al. 2010; Hare et al. 2010; Rilling and Sanfey 2011; Carter
et al. 2012; Morishima et al. 2012; Carter et al. 2012; Morishima et al. 2012).
However, whether information encoded in TPJ is incorporated into vmPFC
value signals during social norm enforcement choices is unknown.
Methods
Forty-seven healthy, right-handed male students performed a strategic
economic game while undergoing fMRI scanning. The behavioral paradigm
in the scanner consisted 24 trials. On all trials, participants split 100 mone-
tary units (MUs) between themselves (Player A) and Player B. For 24 par-
ticipants Player B represented a human counterpart and for 23 participants
Player B was a computer. Subsequently, Player B made a decision about
how many monetary units to spend on punishment (the computer was took
actions based on previously acquired human behavioural data). The punish-
ment rate selected by Player Bs decreased with greater transfers in an ap-
proximately linear fashion. All participants were randomly matched against
di↵erent players on each trial (i.e. a one-shot game). Each trial consisted
of a treatment screen indicating the trial type for 6s, a participant driven
decision period (mean 4.3s, SD 2.7s), then a wait period of 6s followed by
a feedback screen displayed for 6s. Trials were separated by a fixation cross
ITI for 6 8.7s, sampled from a uniform distribution, thus the decision pe-
riod started at least 12s after the previous trials feedback. During the task,
participants faced 12 strategic trials where player A was punished 5 MUs for
every MU that player B spent and 12 non-strategic trials, where player B
could not punish player A at all. Both participants began every trial with a
reserve of 25MUs and therefore, Player B was always able to punish Player
A completely (i.e. take away all earnings) during the punishment trials. Our
primary GLM for fMRI analysis modeled four regressor types: 1) treatment,
2) decision, 3) wait, and 4) feedback periods in all trials and separately for
non-strategic only (8 regressor onsets in total). In addition, we used three
parametric regressors (PR): PR1) kept amount at decision onset in all tri-
als, PR2) kept amount at previous within-condition decision and PR3) profit
amount at feedback onset for all trials. SPM 8 software was used to estimate
this GLM and compute contrasts of interest in each individual participant.
In addition, a second GLM was formulated to test the PPI e↵ects relating to
the vmPFC region correlating with value from the first analysis. The vmPFC
time series was used as a physiological regressor and interacted with two sep-
arate psychological boxcar regressors for strategic and non-strategic trials.
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This resulted in two separate PPI regressors. This PPI GLM consisted of
the following nine regressors: 1) vmPFC time series, 2) non-strategic decision
boxcar, 3) strategic decision boxcar, 4) non-strategic decision X vmPFC, 5)
strategic decision X vmPFC, 6) non-strategic wait period (6 sec boxcar), 7)
strategic wait period (6 sec boxcar), 8) non-strategic profit screen (6 sec box-
car), and 9) strategic profit screen (6 sec boxcar). Similar to the first GLM,
parametric regressors for kept amount at decision, previous kept amount at
decision and profit amount at feedback were included for both punishment
and control conditions. Lastly, six motion parameter regressors were also
included.
Results and Discussion
Behaviorally, there was no di↵erence in total amounts transferred be-
tween the Social and Non-social treatment groups. The transfer rates in the
non-strategic game are consistent with average rates ( 20 %) reported in the
previous literature (C. Camerer 2003). Participants in the role of Player A
transferred more in strategic than non-strategic conditions in both the social
and the nonsocial treatments. These results suggest that Player A strategi-
cally increased the amount transferred to Player B to decrease the likelihood
that Player B would exercise his punishment option and reduce Player As
earnings regardless of whether Player B was a human or a computer pro-
grammed to mimic human reactions. In our initial neuroimaging analysis,
we examined the degree to which vmPFC activity reflected value compu-
tations during monetary transfer decisions in both treatment types using a
general linear model on blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signals. This
analysis showed a positive association between kept amounts and vmPFC
BOLD activity across all participants. The correlation between amount kept
and BOLD activity in the vmPFC region of interest (ROI) was not signifi-
cantly di↵erent between treatment groups indicating that participants play-
ing against humans and computers represented the amount kept to an equal
degree in vmPFC. The vmPFC result is consistent with theoretical models
and existing empirical data suggesting a central role for vmPFC in the com-
putation of subjective values for a wide range of decision contexts (Kable
and Glimcher 2009; Hare et al. 2010; Rushworth et al. 2012; Bartra et al.
2013; Clithero and Rangel 2014). Such theories also posit that if vmPFC
acts as a general valuation system, then its interactions will be modulated
such that coupling with regions providing decision relevant information will
increase. Next, we tested the hypothesis that the coupling between vmPFC
and the right TPJ will increase more during decisions that require strategic
evaluations of another persons response to the outcome than in complex-
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ity matched control conditions using a psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
analysis with the vmPFC as the seed region. We found that participants
in the Social treatment showed more positive correlations between TPJ and
vmPFC in strategic trials compared to the Non-social treatment. In order
to test whether vmPFC-TPJ PPI strength is related to the overall strate-
gic play of the participants, we tested whether the individual PPI di↵erence
contrast (strategic minus non-strategic) di↵erentially correlated with partic-
ipants average punishment amounts in the Social compared to Non-social
groups. This second level, between subjects regression analysis revealed a
link between vmPFC-TPJ PPI during strategic trials and average punish-
ment levels that was stronger in Social than Non-social treatment partici-
pants. In the Social group, greater vmPFC-TPJ PPI was associated with
less punishment by Player B, while there was no significant relationship in
the Non-social group. Decisions that balance welfare for self with the im-
pacts on and reactions of others to ones own choices are ubiquitous in social
life. Our results provide insights into the neural mechanisms underlying such
behavior and suggest a key role for interactions between TPJ and vmPFC.
These findings are an important advance in our understanding of the neu-
robiology underlying strategic social choice and provide a basis for future
investigations into this central aspect of human behavior.
2.2 Study 2
Background
The Ultimatum game (UG; Gth et al. 1982) is a widely used paradigm
for studying social decisions in which monetary gain and fairness (i.e. equal-
ity) attributes both play important roles in determining players choices (see
Methods; Fehr and Camerer 2007). The finding that people do not behave
according to the Nash equilibrium (Mailath 1998) predicted by assumptions
of purely selfish preferences in the UG is extremely robust (List 2007; Slonim
and Roth 1998; Cameron 1999; Andersen et al. 2011). However, the precise
proportion of the total amount proposers o↵er and responders are willing to
accept varies across both individuals and choice contexts, indicating that ex-
pressed social preferences are malleable and at least partially state-dependent
(Chang and Sanfey 2013; Wright et al. 2011; Sanfey 2009; Ho↵man et al. 2000;
Henrich et al. 2001; Andersen et al. 2011).
Previous UG experiments have shown that aspects of the UG choice sit-
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uation relate to neural activity. For example, both objective and contextual
aspects of fairness are reflected in the insula (Wright et al. 2011). Modifica-
tions to the UG can also give insight into the neural mechanisms underlying
it, such as using the explicit cognitive strategy of reappraising the intentions
of the proposer as more negative or positive that has been shown to recruit
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity and to decrease and increase o↵er
acceptance rates, respectively (Wout et al. 2010; Grecucci et al. 2013). Ex-
ogenously altering lateral PFC activity via transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) also changes the acceptance rate of unfair o↵ers, despite leaving the
fairness judgments of those o↵ers unchanged (Knoch et al. 2006; Baumgart-
ner et al. 2011).
Recent work has utilized sequential sampling models (SSMs) to examine
social decision making processes and provided novel insights into interper-
sonal behavior. Originally applied to perceptual and categorization tasks,
sequential sampling models have been extended to the domain of value-based
choices (Forstmann et al. 2016), and more recently social decision making.
Thus far, SSMs have been shown to account for behavior in both two-person
asset allocation decisions (e.g. UG) and charitable donation decisions (Kra-
jbich et al. 2015; Hutcherson et al. 2015). In fact, it has been shown that the
parameters of an SSM fit to decisions over primary rewards for self in one
sample of participants can accurately predict the choices and reaction times
of a separate group of participants playing in the role of responder in the UG
(Krajbich et al. 2015).
Methods
In total, 24 healthy, adults were entered into the analysis who had played
our ultimatum game while undergoing fMRI scanning. This game consisted
of two players: player A who was endowed with a sum of money and was able
to o↵er a portion of this endowment to player B. Player B was then given
the option to accept the o↵er or reject it, causing the whole endowment to
be returned to the experimenter. The modification to the original Ultima-
tum game consisted of an attentional focus manipulation. Every o↵er was
repeated over three focus conditions (Money, Fairness and Natural). The to-
tal endowment varied on each trial in order to minimize the correlation (r =
0.40) between monetary amount o↵ered and the fairness of the ultimatums.
We analyzed participants decision processes in each condition using a
hierarchical Drift Di↵usion Model that allowed us to model both reaction
times and choice outcomes. To this end, we estimated a drift di↵usion model
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for each condition, where the outcomes were accept or reject, and the starting
bias and input function to the drift rate were allowed to vary. The input
function was a linear combination of an intercept term, z-scored magnitude
and fairness where the weights on each term were allowed to vary across
conditions and subjects. Across subjects, the bias term and each of the
weights on the input function to the drift rate was significantly greater than
the null distribution. Similar to the logistic regression, there was a greater
e↵ect of o↵er magnitude in the money focus condition, and a greater e↵ect
of o↵er fairness in the fairness focus compared to the other conditions.
We used a standard mass univariate GLM approach to model these e↵ects
with a design matrix (GLM-1) where all trials were modeled as having the du-
ration of reaction times. Thus the design matrix consisted of eight regressors:
four regressors of interest: accept and reject onsets, with parametric modula-
tors of o↵er and fairness aligned with each of these onsets and four regressors
considered relevant to explain the variance in the experiment: trial onsets for
fair and none conditions, as well as onsets for missed trials (duration 3 sec-
onds) and the instruction screens (duration 5 seconds). GLM-1 was applied
at a single subject level using SPM8. Group level non-parametric analysis
was carried out using the FSL (Winkler et al. 2014) randomise function.
Using the DDM model fit parameters to derive an overall drift rate per
trial, correlations with BOLD activity were tested using three GLMs where
the durations were similar to those in GLM-1. In GLM-3, a dummy regressor
and a parametric modulator of the drift rate was used for all trials. In addi-
tion, dummy regressors were included for the money fairness focus conditions
as well as the rejected trials, missed trials and instruction screens in order to
account for extra known sources of variance.
Results and discussion
Participants choice behavior was similar to that reported in previous stud-
ies using the ultimatum game (C. F. Camerer 2003; Fehr and Camerer 2007).
The focus manipulations did change this, with more acceptance in the mone-
tary condition and less acceptance in the fair condition compared to baseline.
This suggests that our manipulation did elicit a behavioral e↵ect in the di-
rection that we had predicted.
The drift rate alone predicted subject responses. Comparisons of the
coe cients reflecting the influence of o↵er magnitude and equality on choices
in each condition revealed that o↵er magnitude had more impact during the
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Money focus condition relative to both neutral focus and Baseline trials,
while the influence of equality was greater when the initial focus was directed
towards the fairness attribute.
The drift rate across all trials identified regions that reflected an inte-
gration of each trials monetary and fairness attributes because the rate of
evidence accumulation (drift) in our DDM varies as a function of the trial-
specific o↵er equality levels and magnitudes as well as the choice context
(Baseline, Fairness or Money conditions). Multiple brain regions exhibited
a BOLD signal that correlated positively with the regressor for drift rate,
including the amygdala, dlPFC, dorsal and ventral portions of the medial
PFC, fronto-polar cortex, insula (anterior and mid), precuneus, parietal cor-
tex, thalamus, and ventral striatum. Next, we tested for brain regions that
di↵erentially represented the evidence for accepting the ultimatum as a func-
tion of the choice the participant ultimately made. This represents the drift
towards the chosen choice and showed significant di↵erences in regions such
as vmPFC, striatum, and posterior cingulate cortex that have been shown
to correlate with stimulus values for a wide range of goods and experiences
(Bartra et al. 2013; Clithero and Rangel 2014) and to adapt value represen-
tations for multi-attribute stimuli according to context or attentional cues
(Nicolle et al. 2012; Hare et al. 2011a; Rudorf and Hare 2014).
These results demonstrate that attentional cues can influence social de-
cision making. and suggest that this e↵ect can be captured by a DDM.
This e↵ect was expected given previous results that have changed the fram-
ing of objectively similar o↵ers (Wright et al. 2011). Several studies have
demonstrated that the perception of fairness can be decoupled from its ef-
fects on behavior This appears to be true whether the manipulation is based
on framing (Wright et al. 2011), altering neurotransmitter levels (Crockett
et al. 2008) or directly interfering with neural activity (Knoch et al. 2006).
This suggests that there may be a di↵erence between a more abstract knowl-
edge of fairness and how it is evaluated and integrated into social decision
making. In this study we observed the latter e↵ect.
2.3 Study 3
Background
Much work has been done on the taxonomy of altruistic behavior in the
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psychological literature (see Feigin et al. 2014, for a systematic review), dif-
ferentiating principally between pure altruism (no net benefit to the self)
and impure altruism (a net gain to the self as well as the other). These two
types of altruism are then subdivided into several explanatory factors such
as the role of emotion or expectations of reciprocity. The economic literature
has taken a broadly similar path (Kagel and Roth 2016), but with more of
an emphasis creating formal models to describe and explain the behavior
(Hubbard et al. 2016; Gino et al. 2016). One of the most tractable forms of
altruisms in a value based framework is charitable donation. This is often
considered to be a pure altruism because the reputation and reciprocity ef-
fects can be controlled for, although it is possible that a ‘warm glow’ from
charitable giving may deliver a primary reward.
Recent evidence suggests that interactions with wealth, goods and e↵ort
have di↵erent e↵ects on the altruistic motive (Holmes et al. 2002; Strahile-
vitz 1999; Mayo and Tinsley 2009). One approach to shed light on the mech-
anisms underlying these interactions is to apply methods from neuroeco-
nomics. Mounting evidence suggests that areas of the brain such as frontal
cortex and striatum are vital to making value based decisions (Hare et al.
2010; Clithero and Rangel 2014). Several studies have used these methods
in order to test whether there may be biological substrates of aspects of
economic games such as the dictator game where there is an option to give
money to another player who otherwise would not receive anything or chari-
table donations. For example (Izuma et al. 2009) found that being observed
while deciding whether to donate to charity or keep the money for oneself
increased charitable giving for di cult choices and that donating while under
observation lead to a greater activation of the ventral striatum.
methods
Sixteen subjects were included in the fMRI study. Prior to scanning,
subjects were told that they had received an endowment of 100 US dollars
before starting the experiment. They then read the experiment instructions
and completed a per-scan rating task in which they rated charities and house-
hold items by how much they were willing to pay (WTP) for them from their
endowment. WTPs were elicited using a Becker de Groot auction. Subjects
then read the instructions for the fMRI experiment and began 4 runs of the
fMRI task while undergoing fMRI scanning.
Integrated decision value was tested in the brain using a GLM including
a parametric regressor derived from taking the (WTP - price) conditional
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on accepting the price (i.e. net value gained) and (price-WTP) conditional
on refusing the item (i.e. net value lost). This regressor had onsets and
durations aligned with the corresponding decision period as well as a boxcar
regressor also with these onsets and durations. Six motion regressors were
also included.
In addition, the di↵erent ways that decision features were encoded for
each charity and purchase choice, were tested. This was achieved with a
GLM including the main e↵ect, WTP and price as well as the six motion
regressors. As such, the design matrix was constructed with two dummy
boxcar regressors for the charity and product conditions, with an onset for
each purchase screen with duration equal to the reaction time. These GLMs
were estimated on individuals’ warped brains using SPM12.
These GLMs were used in mass univariate analyses and a cvMANOVA
analysis, using a MANOVA framework cross validated using the 4 runs as
separate folds for analysis. (Allefeld and Haynes 2014).
Results and discussion
While most behavior between conditions was not significantly di↵erent,
the WTPs of charities and products were trend-level significant. However,
a similar trend was observed in the pilot data and prices were chosen as to
o↵set the impact of this di↵erence. As such, during scanning, the average
di culty (defined as |WTP   price|) of product and charity trials was not
significantly di↵erent.
The integrated decision value was tested against the BOLD signal using
mass univariate and multivariate analyses. The univariate approach showed
the BOLD signal in anterior cingulate cortex correlated negatively with the
integrated decision variable, but only in product trials. Two analyses were
tested using the multivariate approach First, the integrated decision value
was tested across all trials, to examine whether cvMANOVA was sensitive
to its e↵ect on BOLD. Significant pattern discriminability was seen in large
areas of the cortex, suggesting that locally distributed processing in these
areas can track the e↵ect of the integrated decision value. In addition, the
di↵erence in this decision value between charity and product trials was tested
with cvMANOVA, revealing significant voxels in areas on the left lateral
frontal cortex, demonstrating that this value may be encoded di↵erentially
in these brain areas depending on the type of decision made.
Testing the price and WTP separately, allowed these attributes and their
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interactions to be tested against the BOLD data. Again, both univariate
and multivariate analyses were tested. The main e↵ects and di↵erences did
not show significant e↵ects except for a negative correlation with price in
the product condition alone. For the multivariate analysis, the voxels in the
searchlight were predicted by two levels of condition and two levels of decision
attribute. This decision attribute factor was tested against the BOLD signal
across the brain and showed left lateral frontal cortex, although in di↵erent
areas to the integrated decision result. One of the strengths of the MANOVA
framework is that it allows cross decoding where there may be non-linear
separation in the patterns exhibited. Thus, we were able to test the stability
of the e↵ect of the attribute factor while accounting for the e↵ects of the
condition factor, i.e. decoding the attribute encoding fit in one condition to
test the other condition.
16
Chapter 3
General conclusions
3.1 Study 1
The first study investigated the neural mechanisms during a strategic and
non-strategic game, playing against a human and against a computer. Strate-
gic thinking can be di cult to precisely analyze, as di↵erent people may have
di↵erent ways of processing the information and this may change even over
the course of an experiment. Rather than try to develop a complete model
of the decision process, the analysis of this study took a broader perspective
and asked a particular question about BOLD activity instead. Specifically,
was there a correlation with value in vmPFC in this strategic game, and was
there a role for the TPJ relating to the presence of a social context. The
correlation with vmPFC was found across all trials as might be expected if
the vmPFC is playing an integrated role. However, it should be noted that
the proxy for the expected value (amount kept) does not attempt to take
into account the value associated with fairness, nor the amount they may
have expected to be punished in the strategic condition. This may be an
issue if the contribution of these sources of value are not proportional to the
amount kept, which may be the case since the relationship with punishment
and fairness may be non-linear, especially on the few occasions that more
than an equal split was transferred. Additionally, the small amounts of vari-
ation in the non-strategic game may have made the estimates of correlations
in the brain more variable. Despite this, there was still a correlation with
the amount kept in the vmPFC, suggesting that the representation of the ex-
pected value is strong enough to outweigh the additional sources of variance.
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One of the important negative findings was that there were no significant
di↵erences in the TPJ across conditions. This was unexpected considering
the literature on the specific role of TPJ in a social setting. This may be
related to the type of task often used in the theory of mind literature where
subjects read a story before being asked to reflect on the mental states or
on non-social aspects of the story (Gallagher et al. 2000). Playing a game
with another player may already be enough to engage the mechanisms of the
TPJ, even though the other player is a computer. One way to reconcile this
e↵ect is to consider the TPJ not as being specific to social contexts, but spe-
cific to the mental processes required in a social context, which may also be
involved in other complex environments or the application of social norms.
The psychophysiological interaction (PPI) e↵ect between TPJ and vmPFC
was more in line with the normal interpretation of its role, with very little
change in coupling during a decion in the non-strategic condition and an in-
crease in coupling in the social strategic condition. Another interesting point
is that the coupling actually decreased in the non-social strategic condition.
Coupled with there being no significant change in the activity in the TPJ,
this may hint at some sort of context dependent information gating. Thus
the TPJ may be engaged during non-social strategic games, but this infor-
mation is not able to be integrated into the decision making process. The
mechanism of this gating function is unknown, but a potential region would
be the dlPFC, regulating the areas that receive the e↵erent TPJ neurons.
3.2 Study 2
The second study examined the decisions of the second player in an ulti-
matum game where subjects were encouraged to focus on di↵erent aspects
of the decision. Several studies have examined neural activity during the
ultimatum game, although these are often focused on the role of emotion
and spite as opposed to the economic implications of the paradigm. Per-
haps the clearest e↵ect was that the personal gain representations of value
up the dorsal frontal medial wall were strongest when subjects were asked
to focus on the money. This result was not as clear when they were asked
to focus on the fairness despite changes in behavior. Two issues may ex-
plain this; firstly the fraction o↵ered may not be directly proportional to the
perceived fairness of the o↵er considering that all of the o↵ers were unfair
Secondly, it is likely that correlations with fairness su↵ered from only having
three levels of fairness to fit, although a simplified approach comparing the
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most and least fair trials also did not show significant correlations. However,
previous literature has demonstrated that di↵erent o↵ers may be enough to
e↵ect behavioural changes, but not trigger reflective judgements of fairness .
Thus it is possible that the unfairness of all o↵ers means that the violations
of the fairness social norm were fairly constant throughout the experiment.
The importance of the drift rate correlations may in fact be larger than the
results showed, considering that a similar approach using the probability of
accepting the o↵er using a logistic regression with the same input function
did not correlate with any neural activity. This may be related to the prob-
ability of choice capturing the simple behavior, whereas the drift rate may
be closer to the actual neural mechanisms occurring during the decision. Al-
though previous studies have shown the importance of drift rate in a social
context (Krajbich et al. 2015), it is still surprising to see the strength of the
e↵ect, considering that the source of evidence is an abstract representation
of money and fairness as opposed to a primary stimuli such as visual or au-
dio shown in the psychophysics literature (Mulder et al. 2013). One of the
results also suggests that the drift rate may be able to capture some more
complex features of the decision process. When rejecting an o↵er, there was
a positive correlation with the drift rate (in favor of accepting) in a portion
of the dorsal cingulate. This may represent an e↵ect similar to an e↵ect of
oddball trials in the stroop task (Veen and Carter 2002). The weaker the
inclination to reject the o↵er, the more active this area was, suggesting that
there may be some sort of conflict in the tradeo↵ when rejecting o↵ers that
is not present when accepting them.
3.3 Study 3
The third study used charitable donations compared to buying products in
order to test contributing factors to altruistic decisions. Despite their im-
portance in altruism, there are surprisingly few studies examining the neural
mechanisms of charitable donation. This may be due to the di culty in
controlling all of the factors at play in altruistc choices. By including a com-
parison with purchasing for personal use, this study was able to get closer to
the unique e↵ects of benefiting others on the decision process. One surprising
result in this experiment was how little BOLD activity correlated with either
WTP or price during these decisions. While the nature of the task was to
purchase an item, the integrated decision value was still expected to correlate
with regions of the brain such as vmPFC. Since the prices were selected to
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be close to the population average WTP, it is possible that hearing the price
during the experiment acted as an anchor, altering their recall of the WTP
and making each decision more di cult than the model would suggest. Sub-
jects were significantly able to act in accordance with their WTP, so using
price and WTP is still likely to be a good model to use, but perhaps there
were more sources of noise contributing to a given voxel when calculating
an integrated representation of value. This would explain why the search-
light analysis had more success at finding patterns in the data. With more
sources to draw upon, it would be less susceptible to noise. In addition,
both products and charities spanned a wide range of types. This may also
explain why a single voxel was unable to fit an integrated value across all
trials, whereas a searchlight had access to a larger area of the brain that was
receiving constituent attributes of the value.
One of the more stringent analyses performed looked for areas of the brain
where the BOLD pattern discriminant for di↵erential decision attributes ex-
isted even when taking out the e↵ects of the pattern discriminant for charity
and product conditions. The region of anterior cingulate that survived this
analysis represents an area where the tradeo↵ between price and WTP exists
for value based decisions in both charity and personal purchase decisions.
3.4 General conclusions
Today, the social e↵ects on neural substrates of value based decision making
are an active area of research (Ru↵ and Fehr 2014). Considering the large role
that sociability plays in our lives, this is a broad area of research and may
help to explain cases where humans deviate from the simplified rationality as-
sumptions made in economics. However, this is one piece of a greater puzzle
of human economic behavior As our understanding of these e↵ects increases,
we may be able to integrate this with other important areas of economics,
for example, how does mentalizing play a role in auctions. Social normative
behavior could be integrated into game theory payo↵ matrices and whether
they are deployed or not may determine the persistence of unstable coordi-
nation in the prisoners dilemma (Axelrod 2006). A more sophisticated model
of charitable giving, including the many contributing factors may yield more
accurate explanations of payments to public goods. Indeed, the integrating
normative behavior more generally may even undermine some predictions of
the standard economic model. For example, the e cient market hypothe-
sis supposes that market prices are correct because people would exchange
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goods until there was no self interested reason to continue (Fama 1970) One
of the issues with this hypothesis is that people may deceive each other with
regards to investment opportunities, but the prediction is that people will
learn who can be trusted and to what extent through feedback. However,
if the other-regarding social norms dictate behavior, then there may be no
feedback to the person who instigated the investment, meaning that there
might be no reason not to deceive.
In addition to the main psychological approaches presented here, the use
of process models of decision such as the DDM may provide a mathematically
amenable way to augment standard economic models of behavior This would
dovetail with current economic thinking on using revealed preference, but
would provide a more nuanced account of behavior than the current general
axioms of revealed preference (Chambers et al. 2017). Although the frames of
the experiments presented here were economic in nature, the key insights were
in the developing understanding of neural mechanisms supporting behavior
Across the three studies, methods such as connectivity analysis, model based
fMRI and multivariate searchlight contributed to understanding in di↵erent
ways.
Considering the spatial limitations of fMRI and the specificity of the cog-
nitive information required for value based decision making, the question of
how strong the inferences we can make is a di cult one to answer. On the
one hand, to see such large scale neuronal e↵ects in the volume of a voxel
suggests that the e↵ect must be strong. However, the diversity of neurons
present in a given voxel may also contribute to that signal, which would sug-
gest that the information carried in that voxel is less specific. Unfortunately
fMRI cannot give detailed observations of neuronal activity and so it is nec-
essary to bear in mind that inferences based on fMRI findings may not be
as directly related to the experimental manipulations as they seem. Instead,
fMRI provides an excellent method of forming the hypothesis space that we
are willing to consider for explaining behavioral data.
In summary, the work presented here represents a small step towards a
much greater problem. By showing that aspects of a value based frame-
work correlate with neural activity, it adds weight to the argument that this
framework should be used to understand social norms. This allows social
information to be integrated into the wider decision making question rather
than be treated as something distinct from simpler human behavior. I believe
that the next steps in understanding how social norms are deployed taps into
themes from judgment and decision making such as heuristics and learning.
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In addition, I believe that future work in rigorous experiments on the ef-
fects of framing as integrated into a value based framework will be fruitful.
Developing these formalizations of this very human behavior may even one
day allow us to better understand the nature of intelligence and shape the
development of artificial intelligence.
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Abstract
In recent years, much has been learned about the representation of subjective value in simple, nonstrategic
choices. However, a large fraction of our daily decisions are embedded in social interactions in which value
guided decisions require balancing benefits for self against consequences imposed by others in response to our
choices. Yet, despite their ubiquity, much less is known about how value computation takes place in strategic
social contexts that include the possibility of retribution for norm violations. Here, we used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to show that when human subjects face such a context connectivity increases between
the temporoparietal junction (TPJ), implicated in the representation of other peoples’ thoughts and intentions, and
regions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) that are associated with value computation. In contrast, we find
no increase in connectivity between these regions in social nonstrategic cases where decision-makers are
immune from retributive monetary punishments from a human partner. Moreover, there was also no increase in
TPJ-vmPFC connectivity when the potential punishment was performed by a computer programmed to punish
fairness norm violations in the same manner as a human would. Thus, TPJ-vmPFC connectivity is not simply a
function of the social or norm enforcing nature of the decision, but rather occurs specifically in situations where
subjects make decisions in a social context and strategically consider putative consequences imposed by others.
Key words: decision-making; fMRI; functional connectivity; norm compliance; strategy
Introduction
A large portion of our daily decisions are embedded in
social interactions in which the values of different behav-
iors depend on the behavior of relevant others. Such
interactions range from major decisions about whether to
apply for a new job and risk upsetting current colleagues
to mundane choices about how much to tip the bartender
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Significance Statement
A large fraction of our decisions are embedded in social contexts that require balancing benefits for self
against the positive or negative reactions of others in response to our choices. Yet, how the brain computes
the value for different courses of action in such choices is unknown. We examined the neurobiological
mechanisms underlying strategic social choices in the context of potential retributive punishment. Our
findings indicate that there are specific increases in the functional interactions between brain regions
previously associated with mentalizing about others’ beliefs and key nodes of the brain’s value computation
system during choices in which it is necessary to balance direct personal gains against the likelihood of
subsequent norm enforcing punishment by other people.
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at your preferred pub in order to maintain favored patron
status. In these and many other situations, social norm
compliance must be considered to avoid peer punish-
ment for norm violations. In all these cases, we need to
take the likely reactions of other people into account.
However, despite their ubiquity, very little is known about
how value computation takes place in contexts where
one’s own behavior may trigger subsequent responses
that affect subjective values.
As a central component of the brain’s decision circuitry,
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) has been as-
sociated with value computation in nonstrategic decision
contexts ranging from primary to social rewards for both
self and others (Nicolle et al., 2012; Bartra et al., 2013;
Clithero and Rangel, 2013) and in choices during compet-
itive games (Hampton et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2012). In
addition, vmPFC lesions have been shown to alter choice
behavior under strategic conditions where norm violations
can result in retributive punishment (Krajbich et al., 2009).
Collectively, these data suggest that vmPFC might com-
pute subjective values in strategic social choices that
require balancing personal preferences with predictions
about how the reactions of others to norm violations will
impact outcomes for self, but this idea has not yet been
directly tested. Furthermore, how predictions about the
opponents’ behavior enter into vmPFC value computa-
tions is unknown. One hypothesis is that such information
is provided to vmPFC by regions that are involved in
mentalizing about others.
Previous research has shown that inferring another per-
son’s beliefs in order to estimate his probable future
actions recruits neural circuits including the temporopari-
etal junction (TPJ; Saxe and Wexler, 2005; Frith and Frith,
2006; Zhu et al., 2012). Moreover, studies on competitive
and cooperative interpersonal games suggest that TPJ
encodes information about other players that could be
used to guide choices (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton
et al., 2008; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; Bhatt et al., 2010;
Hare et al., 2010; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Carter et al.,
2012; Morishima et al., 2012; Carter and Huettel, 2013).
However, whether information encoded in TPJ is incorpo-
rated into vmPFC value signals during social norm en-
forcement choices is unknown. Therefore, we sought to
examine whether TPJ-vmPFC interactions underlie value
computations in this type of strategic social choice.
We examined brain activity using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) during decisions about the di-
vision of monetary assets between participants paired
with either another human (social treatment) or a com-
puter partner programmed to enforce social norm viola-
tions (nonsocial treatment). On each trial, participants had
to choose how to divide 100 monetary units between
themselves and the partner. However, these monetary
allocation decisions were made in two distinct contexts.
In the punishment context, the partner could punish per-
ceived violations of the social norm for fairness by paying
to reduce the participant’s earnings, whereas in the con-
trol condition the partner could not enforce norm compli-
ance through retributive punishment. The combination of
these treatments and conditions allowed us to examine
brain activity that was specific to choices that were both
social and required strategic reasoning to optimize direct
monetary gain against the probability of profit-reducing
punishments for fairness norm violations.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-seven healthy, right-handed male students per-
formed a strategic economic game while undergoing fMRI
scanning. Participants were screened for fMRI contrain-
dications including acute medical conditions and psychi-
atric or neurological illness. All participants provided
written informed consent in accordance with the local
ethics committee.
Behavioral Paradigm
The behavioral paradigm proceeded as follows. On
each trial, participants split 100 monetary units (MUs)
between themselves (Player A) and Player B. For 24 par-
ticipants Player B represented a human counterpart (so-
cial treatment group, mean age ! SD, 23.5 ! 2.3 years)
and for 23 participants Player B was a computer (nonso-
cial treatment group, mean age ! SD, 24.8 ! 1.9 years).
Participants were randomly assigned to either the social
or nonsocial treatment groups upon arrival for the exper-
iment. One participant from the social treatment was
excluded from all analyses for a lack of comprehension of
the task and two participants from the nonsocial group
were excluded from the fMRI analyses described below
because they never transferred any MUs (leaving 23 so-
cial and 21 nonsocial participants). The social group was
instructed that each human Player B’s punishment deci-
sions had been acquired in a previous experiment using
the strategy method. This method involved Player B mak-
ing a decision about how many monetary units to spend
on punishment if Player A transferred a specific amount.
The punishment rate selected by human Player Bs de-
creased with greater transfers in an approximately linear
fashion. The data from all Player Bs was used to generate
a punishment distribution function and program the com-
puter algorithm for the nonsocial treatment. The nonsocial
group participants were instructed that they were playing
against a computer that had been programmed to simu-
late the responses of the previous human Player B group
and were given the same details as the social treatment
participants about the strategy method of choice elicita-
tion for Player Bs. All participants were randomly matched
against different players on each trial (i.e. a one-shot
game). Payment included 20 Euros for participating and 1
Euro per 100 MU earned. Each trial consisted of a treat-
ment screen indicating the trial type for 6 s, a participant
driven decision period (mean 4.3 s, SD 2.7 s), then a wait
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period of 6 s followed by a feedback screen displayed for
6 s. Trials were separated by a fixation cross ITI for 6–8.7
s, sampled from a uniform distribution, thus the decision
period started at least 12 s after the previous trials feed-
back. During the task, participants faced 12 control trials
(CON) and 12 punishment trials (PUN) in a random order
as indicated during the treatment screen. In CON trials,
Player B was not able to punish Player A for making a
selfish split (i.e. a dictator game scenario); however, in
PUN trials Player B could punish Player A by 5 MUs for
each 1 MU spent. Both participants began every trial with
a reserve of 25 MUs and therefore, Player B was always
able to punish Player A completely (i.e. take away all
earnings) during the punishment trials.
Behavioral Analysis
The behavioral variable of interest was the amount
kept/transferred by participants in the role of Player A as
a function of group and condition. There was a non-
normal distribution of transferred amounts in CON trials
(Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test, p " 0.03), therefore, we ana-
lyzed the transfer amount data using nonparametric Wil-
coxon signed rank (paired) and Kruskal–Wallis rank sum
tests. All p values reported are based on two-sided tests.
To better describe the punishment distributions, we lin-
early regressed punishment on the transfer amount for the
social and nonsocial groups.
MRI Acquisition
Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) echo planar im-
aging (EPI) scans were performed on a 3 Tesla Siemens
Magnetom Allegra using 32 slices and a voxel resolution
of 2 # 2 # 2 mm ($0.5 mm slice gap), with a TR of 2490
ms, and a TE of 38 ms. All fMRI data was acquired during
a single scanning session (mean length of 750 s, SD 38.5
s). A full brain EPI (56 slices using the same parameters as
functional EPI) and anatomical scan (sagittal MPRAGE T1
sequence with a voxel size of 1 # 1 # 1 mm) were also
acquired. The fMRI data preprocessing included slice-
time correction, spatial realignment to the mean EPI im-
age for each subject, normalization to MNI space, and
smoothing with a 10 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel using
the SPM 8 software (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK).
fMRI Analysis
Our primary GLM (GLM-1) was computed to examine
BOLD activity relating to the amount kept/transferred dur-
ing the decision period. GLM-1 modeled four regressor
types: (1) treatment, (2) decision, (3) wait, and (4) feedback
periods in all trials (PUN and CON) and separately for
CON only (8 regressor onsets in total). Single 0 s duration
stick functions were convolved with the canonical HRF for
the treatment, decision and feedback periods, and a 6 s
boxcar function was used for convolution during the wait
period. In addition, we used three parametric regressors
(PR): (PR1) kept amount at decision onset in all trials,
(PR2) kept amount at previous within-condition decision,
and (PR3) profit amount at feedback onset for all trials. Six
motion parameter regressors were also included in
GLM-1. Note that the initial endowment is fixed at 100
MUs for every trial, and therefore, a positive correlation
with the amount kept by Player A (PR1) implies a negative
correlation with amount transferred to Player B.
SPM 8 software was used to estimate GLM-1 and
compute contrasts of interest in each individual partici-
pant.
At the second level, we used the “randomise” function
from the FSL 5.0.6 software package (http://www.fmri-
b.ox.ac.uk/fsl/) to test for regions that reflected the
amount kept across all participants. We computed a one
sample t-test on the single participant contrasts for pos-
itive correlations with the kept amount regressor together
with a nuisance variable (0 " social, 1" nonsocial) to
explain variance due to social and nonsocial participant
groups. We performed the t test using the nonparametric
permutation algorithm in randomise in combination with
the threshold-free cluster enhancement (TFCE) method
implemented in FSL (Smith and Nichols, 2009). Test sta-
tistics and p values were derived from 5000 permutations.
We corrected for multiple comparisons using familywise
error correction at the whole-brain level to achieve cor-
rected significance levels of p % 0.05.
PPI Analysis
For each participant, a seed time course in vmPFC was
extracted from a 4 mm sphere centered on the voxel with
the strongest correlation with kept amount in that partic-
ipant from within the overlapping voxels for the group
vmPFC cluster generated by GLM-1 and an anatomical
mask of vmPFC including the rectal gyrus, medial orbito-
frontal, and anterior cingulate cortex below z " 5 (5464 8
mm3 voxels) based on the AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer
et al., 2002). The vmPFC time series was deconvolved as
outlined by Gitelman et al., (2003) before creating the
psychophysiological interaction regressors. For the psy-
chophysiological interaction (PPI) GLM (GLM-PPI), the
vmPFC time series was used as a physiological regressor
and interacted with two separate psychological boxcar
regressors for the decision period in CON and PUN con-
ditions. This resulted in two separate psychophysiological
interaction terms in GLM-PPI. In GLM-PPI, the decision
period duration was modeled as 5 s before the first button
press. This expanded window was used because the
precise timing of the amount to keep/transfer computa-
tion within the treatment and decision screen periods
cannot be determined in this task. However, this timing
resolution limitation would not bias the results in favor of
any specific decision type and, if anything, works against
the current findings by adding noise to the analysis. GLM-
PPI consisted of the following nine regressors: (1) vmPFC
time series, (2) CON decision period boxcar, (3) PUN
decision period boxcar, (4) CON decision # vmPFC, (5)
PUN decision# vmPFC, (6) CON wait period (6 s boxcar),
(7) PUN wait period (6 s boxcar), (8) CON profit screen (6
s boxcar), and (9) PUN profit screen (6 s boxcar). Note
that, a one-way ANOVA for the SDs of the PPI regressors
for group and condition showed that they were not sig-
nificantly different (F(1,83) " 1.14, p " 0.338) suggesting
that the PPI analysis was not biased against CON condi-
tions where kept amounts showed less variance. Similar
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to GLM-1, parametric regressors for kept amount at de-
cision, previous kept amount at decision and profit
amount at feedback were included for both punishment
and control conditions. Last, GLM-PPI included the six
motion parameter regressors. A PPI analysis using the
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) seed noted in
Table 1 was also performed. The analysis was identical to
GLM-PPI, except that the BOLD time courses were ex-
tracted from the dmPFC ROI rather than the vmPFC ROI
described above.
Following estimation of GLM-PPI in SPM8, single par-
ticipant contrasts were computed for regressors of inter-
est. At the second level, we again used TFCE and the
nonparametric permutation function, randomise, to test
for between group differences in connectivity with
vmPFC. Test statistics and p values were derived from
5000 permutations. Based on previous work (Morishima
et al., 2012) showing that social preferences during inter-
personal interactions are linked to structural and func-
tional differences in the TPJ, we created a spherical ROI
with 10 mm radius around the MNI coordinates (x, y, z "
60, &44, 18). The conjunction of this ROI and the group
functional coverage mask was used for small volume
correction (324 8 mm3 voxels). This functional coverage
map was utilized because the acquisition parameters for
the functional MRI data did not provide whole-brain cov-
erage, and in some cases, the tilt of the transverse slices
relative to anterior commissure–posterior commissure re-
sulted in lack of coverage for the superior temporal and
inferior parietal cortex. Forty-two participants (21 social
and 21 nonsocial) had adequate functional coverage and
were included in the PPI analysis. We corrected for mul-
tiple comparisons using familywise error correction within
this mask to achieve small volume correction (SVC) of p%
0.05.
The bar plots shown in Figure 3cwere created by taking
the average vmPFC- TPJ PPI coefficients from all voxels
in the functional ROI for the difference between social and
nonsocial punishment trials shown in Figure 3a. These bar
plots are presented for visualization purposes only and
were not used as a basis for any statistical analysis.
In addition to comparing the PPIs during the PUN de-
cisions between groups, we also tested for an association
between the vmPFC-TPJ PPI during punishment deci-
sions and the average punishment received by each indi-
vidual within the social and nonsocial groups. We applied
the same TPJ small volume correction described above
for this analysis.
Last, we performed a post hoc analysis of correlations
with profit during the PUN feedback condition (GLM-PPI
regressor 9) by extracting PUN profit betas from all sig-
nificant voxels in the social PUN PPI cluster shown in
Figure 3b.
Results
Behaviorally, there was no difference in the total
amounts transferred between the social and nonsocial
treatment groups (Kruskal–Wallis '2(1,N"88) " 0.48, p "
0.49). Transfers in the social CON condition were on
average 9.3 MU (SD 17.0), leading to an average percent-
age split of 22.9% for Player B after accounting for the 25
MU reserve amount for both players. These transfer rates
are consistent with average rates ( 20%) reported in the
previous literature (Camerer, 2003). Participants in the role
of Player A transferred more in PUN than CON conditions
in both the social [Wilcoxon signed rank (W) " 276, p "
2.88e&5] and the nonsocial treatments (W " 231, p "
6.36e&5; Fig. 1). These results suggest that Player A
strategically increased the amount transferred to Player B
to decrease the likelihood that Player B would exercise his
punishment option and reduce Player A’s earnings re-
gardless of whether Player B was a human or a computer
programmed to mimic human reactions. Increasing the
amount transferred in PUN trials was in fact the best
strategy for Player A to maximize his earnings because
the punishment amount decreased with greater transfers
(with zero punishment above a transfer of 50 MUs) in an
approximately linear fashion (Fig. 2).
Table 1 Regions correlating with the amount kept by Player A at the time of choice
Region Hemisphere Extent x y z Peak T
Lingual gyrus R/L 1257 8 &74 8 5.21
Cingulate gyrus R/L 39 2 &10 36 4.54
vmPFCa-ACC R/L 36 0 48 &2 4.14
mPFC-paracingulate gyrus R/L 30 0 54 4 3.79
mPFC-ACC R/L 28 &4 44 14 3.91
Frontopolar cortex/IFG R 23 42 44 0 4.75
dmPFCb-paracingulate/SFG R/L 21 &2 50 26 5.45
Occipital cortex R 20 42 &76 &6 4.69
ACC R/L 18 0 26 28 4.22
Thalamus L 16 &12 &34 8 3.90
vmPFC-ACC R 14 8 48 0 3.82
Frontopolar cortex L 11 &16 58 28 5.00
Cingulate gyrus L 10 &4 &4 32 3.95
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are significant at p % 0.05
whole-brain familywise error corrected for multiple comparisons.
IFG, Inferior frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; R, right; L, left.
avmPFC cluster used as a mask to extract subject specific time courses for PPI analyses.
bdmPFC cluster used as a mask to extract subject specific time courses for PPI analyses.
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In our initial neuroimaging analysis, we examined the
degree to which vmPFC activity reflected value compu-
tations during monetary transfer decisions in both treat-
ment types using a general linear model on BOLD signals.
This analysis showed a positive association between kept
amounts and vmPFC BOLD activity (Fig. 3a; p % 0.05
whole-brain corrected) across all participants. In addition
to vmPFC, BOLD activity in dmPFC, right frontopolar
cortex, and occipital regions also correlated with the
amount kept at the time of choice (Table 1). The correla-
tion between amount kept and BOLD activity in the
vmPFC ROI was not significantly different between treat-
ment groups (two-sample t test, t(42) " 1.4, p " 0.332
uncorrected) indicating that participants playing against
humans and computers represented the amount kept to
an equal degree in vmPFC. Furthermore, there was no
significant difference between the social and nonsocial
groups in the correlation with amount kept and BOLD
activity in any brain region after correcting for multiple
comparisons.
The vmPFC result is consistent with theoretical models
and existing empirical data suggesting a central role for
vmPFC in the computation of subjective values for a wide
range of decision contexts (Kable and Glimcher, 2009;
Rangel and Hare, 2010; Rushworth et al., 2012; Bartra
et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2013). Such theories
also posit that if vmPFC acts as a general valuation
system, then its interactions will be modulated such that
coupling with regions providing decision relevant informa-
tion will increase.
Next, we tested the hypothesis that the coupling be-
tween vmPFC and the right TPJ will increase more during
decisions that require strategic evaluations of another
person’s response to the outcome than in complexity
matched control conditions using a PPI analysis with the
vmPFC as the seed region. This analysis examines
whether the correlations between vmPFC activity and
other brain regions differ in social versus nonsocial PUN
transfer decisions. Note that in both the social and non-
social PUN conditions participants need to make strategic
transfer decisions that take into account Player B’s likely
level of punishment (i.e. fairness norm enforcement), and
it is only the nature of Player B (human vs computer) that
differs between groups. We found that participants in the
social treatment showed more positive correlations be-
tween TPJ and vmPFC in PUN trials compared with the
nonsocial treatment (Fig 3; p % 0.05 SVC; peak T " 3.97
at x, y, z " 60, &48, 16; extent " 115 voxels). Post hoc
one-sample t tests showed that the average PPI effect in
these voxels for social PUN was greater than zero (t(20) "
2.51; p " 0.021), whereas the average PPI effect for
nonsocial PUN was less than zero (t(20) " &3.79; p "
0.001). Exploratory analyses revealed no other regions
that showed this pattern of connectivity with vmPFC after
correcting for multiple comparisons. However, for com-
pleteness, we also list regions exceeding a threshold
determined by the lowest individual voxel t statistic (t )
2.29) derived from the right TPJ cluster (Table 2). Further-
more, there were no voxels that showed a significant PPI
effect in either social or nonsocial CON trials after cor-
recting for multiple comparisons within the independent
TPJ ROI or in the entire volume.
To test whether vmPFC-TPJ PUN PPI strength is re-
lated to the overall strategic play of the participants, we
tested whether the individual PPI difference contrast (PUN
& CON) differentially correlated with participants’ average
punishment amounts in the social compared with nonso-
Figure 1 Amounts transferred by Player A in the PUN and the
CON condition of both the social and the nonsocial treatment.
Transfers are represented in experimental monetary units out of
a given amount of 100 units. Error bars represent the standard
error of the mean for the group mean. Paired sample Wilcoxon
signed rank tests (social W " 276, p " 2.88e&5; nonsocial W "
231, p " 6.36e&5) showed significant differences between the
PUN and CON transfer rates in each group.
Figure 2 The plot shows punishment distributions as a function
of amount transferred for both social (blue) and nonsocial groups
(red). Punishment was regressed onto transfers up to 50 MUs,
with the predicted punishment (thick line) and the SDs of the
residuals (shaded area) for each transfer amount. Transfers )50
MU resulted in zero punishment. The overlapping distributions
for the social and nonsocial treatments indicate that the com-
puter algorithm was successful in replicating human punishment
behavior.
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cial groups. This second level, between subjects regres-
sion analysis revealed a link between vmPFC-TPJ PPI
during PUN trials and average punishment levels that
were stronger in social more than nonsocial treatment
participants. In the social group, greater vmPFC-TPJ PPI
was associated with less punishment by Player B,
whereas there was no significant relationship in the non-
social group (Fig. 4; p % 0.05 SVC; peak T " 3.88 at x, y,
z " 56, &50, 16; extent 8 voxels).
For completeness, we repeated our PPI analysis replac-
ing the vmPFC seed with a region of dmPFC that also
correlated with amount kept at the time of choice. We
tested this dmPFC seed in addition to vmPFC because
the dmPFC has been implicated in alternative value rep-
resentation and strategic mentalizing processes (Frith and
Frith, 2006; Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli and Nagel,
2009; Nicolle et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2012). However, we
found no significant differences in connectivity with the
dmPFC during social compared with nonsocial PUN trials
within our TPJ ROI or at the whole-brain level after cor-
recting for multiple comparisons.
We also examined brain activity at the time of outcome
when subjects learned how much profit they had made in
the previous trial. We found that the parametric regressor
for profit magnitude at outcome (PR3 from GLM-1) cor-
related with BOLD activity in several regions, including
bilateral striatum and left lateral frontal cortex (p % 0.05
whole-brain corrected; Table 3). Just as with the BOLD
correlations at the time of choice, there were no regions
showing a difference between the social and nonsocial
groups in the correlation with profit magnitude at out-
come. In addition, we conducted an ROI analysis on the
BOLD correlation with profit at feedback using the voxels
from the TPJ cluster showing the PUN PPI difference
between the groups. We found that across all subjects
there was a significantly negative effect of profit on TPJ
activity at the time of feedback (one sample t(41) " &2.15,
p " 0.037), and once again, the groups did not signifi-
cantly differ in this effect (two sample t(40) " 0.13, p "
0.90).
Discussion
Our results indicate a role for vmPFC in the computation
of value during strategic choices involving norm enforce-
ment and suggest that increased TPJ-vmPFC coupling is
especially important in decisions that involve strategic
Figure 3 Activity and connectivity at the time of choice. a, Regions showing a positive correlation with the amount of monetary units
participants decided to keep on each trial across all decision types. The green arrow indicates the vmPFC cluster used to extract time
courses for the PPI analysis. b, Region of TPJ showing increased functional connectivity with vmPFC during strategic decisions made
in social punishment compared with nonsocial punishment contexts. All voxels shown in a and b are significant at p % 0.05 after
correcting for multiple comparisons. c, Bar graph showing the relative coupling between vmPFC and TPJ by treatment group and
choice context and demonstrating that increased TPJ-vmPFC coupling is specific to choices that are both strategic and social in
nature. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean for the group mean. These bar plots are presented for visualization
purposes only and were not used as a basis for any statistical analysis.
Table 2 Location and extent of functional clusters showing a difference in PPI with vmPFC between social and nonsocial PUN
decisions that was greater than or equal to the effect in our a priori TPJ region
Region Hemisphere Extent x y z Peak T
TPJ R 144 60 &48 16 3.97
Parahippocampal gyrus R 93 22 &26 &14 3.87
Lingual gyrus R 86 28 &50 4 3.87
Fusiform cortex L 78 &34 &38 &18 4.12
Fusiform cortex L 66 &38 &2 &32 4.31
White matter/insular cortex L 60 &28 &16 24 3.96
STG L 51 &52 &24 6 3.36
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics derived from 5000 permutations of the data. Clusters reported are all of those that
surpass a threshold set by lowest t value in the small volume corrected TPJ cluster (t ) 2.29) and minimum cluster size of 50 voxels (2 # 2 # 2 mm). Note
that these results are reported here for completeness only and are not corrected for multiple comparisons and thus not the subject of any inference in this
paper. STG, Superior temporal gyrus.
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considerations of how social others will react to one’s
own actions. Despite the fact that participants were fully
informed that the computer opponents were programmed
to punish fairness norm violations at the same levels as
real human players, the coupling between TPJ and
vmPFC value computation regions did not increase in
nonsocial PUN decisions, and in fact, decreased relative
to the nondecision baseline.
This pattern of TPJ results is consistent with previous
experiments showing that multivariate analyses of TPJ
activity could be used to help predict bet and fold deci-
sions in a simplified poker game against human oppo-
nents, but including TPJ activity measures actually
decreased the model’s predictive power for computer
opponents (Carter et al., 2012). These previous experi-
ments did not however examine the connectivity between
TPJ and other brain regions. Our TPJ-vmPFC connectivity
results demonstrate that in the realm of value-based
choices, TPJ-vmPFC coupling increases during strategic
choices when paired with human counterparts, but de-
creases with computer partners. Moreover, increased
connectivity between vmPFC and TPJ at the time of
choice is associated with more advantageous strategic
decision-making (i.e. lower norm-enforcing punishment)
in social but not nonsocial contexts. This is consistent
with the idea that vmPFC incorporates information from
distributed brain regions into value computations and that
inputs are either enhanced or inhibited as a function of
their relevance in the current state. Moreover, TPJ-
vmPFC coupling did not significantly increase in either the
social or the nonsocial CON trials where punishment pre-
dictions were not necessary because the opponent could
not respond. This indicates that TPJ-vmPFC connectivity
was not simply a function of the social nature of the
decision, but rather occurred selectively when both social
and strategic factors were in play.
Previous work has shown that TPJ activity reflects so-
cial learning signals in the context of repeated interactions
where it is advantageous to learn about other human
players (Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2008). This
learning takes the form of update signals measuring de-
viations from the expected result at the time of feedback
when decision outcomes are shown. These update or
error signals are presumably used to guide subsequent
choices when paired with the same person in the future,
although the impact of TPJ activity at the time of subse-
quent choices was not explicitly examined in these pre-
vious reports. In the current paradigm, participants are
paired with a different human partner on each trial, and
therefore, outcomes of previous trial choices cannot be
directly applied to future decisions. However, it may be
that TPJ activity also plays a role in forming expectations
based on average or normative behavior. There is a strong
social norm for fairness and this norm could be used as a
basis for predicting the degree of punishment by an un-
known Player B that would result from various monetary
splits. Consistent with this role, we found that TPJ activity
increased when participants were shown feedback indi-
Figure 4 Regions of the TPJ relating to the vmPFC PPI at time of choice. a, The voxels in magenta show greater increases in
connectivity with vmPFC during PUN choices in the social compared with the nonsocial group, controlling for connectivity in CON
trials. Voxels in yellow are those where the PUN & CON PPI was significantly correlated with individual average punishment levels in
the social, but not the nonsocial group. Green voxels represent the overlap of both effects. Clusters are significant at p % 0.05 SVC
within the TPJ small volume shown in white. b, The fitted regression slopes between TPJ-vmPFC PPI at the time of choice and an
individual’s average punishment level separately for the social (blue) and nonsocial (red) groups. The shading around the regression
lines indicates the 95% confidence intervals.
Table 3 Regions correlating with profit at the time of feed-
back
Region Hemisphere Extent x y z Peak T
Insula/striatum R/L 1645 32 12 4 6.97
Striatum L 475 &30 &14 10 5.5
Frontopolar cortex L 325 &38 60 4 4.88
Precentral gyrus R 44 58 &4 22 4.17
Caudate tail R 16 18 &4 26 3.85
Posterior insula L 16 &38 &18 0 4.32
Parietal operculum L 10 &48 &30 22 4.28
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are significant at p
%0.05 whole-brain familywise error corrected for multiple comparisons.
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cating that a strategic adjustment was necessary (i.e. low
profits) on the following choice to avoid future norm en-
forcing responses from Player B. Moreover, the results
summarized in Figure 4 suggest that increased connec-
tivity between TPJ and vmPFC may be a mechanism by
which such predictions are incorporated into value com-
putations at the time of choice.
In addition to vmPFC, BOLD activity in several other
brain regions, particularly dmPFC, correlated with the
amount kept for oneself when deciding how to allocate
MUs on each trial. The correlation with kept amount in
dmPFC is of particular interest given previous findings
that activity in this region relates to individual differences
in type or level of reasoning during social interactions
(Hampton et al., 2008; Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; Zhu
et al., 2012). Our findings in dmPFC build on these previ-
ous individual difference results and demonstrate that this
region also reflects choice specific components of stra-
tegic valuation during decisions in which social norm
compliance can be enforced through peer punishment.
Although the current dataset was not designed to distin-
guish between the value related activity in regions such as
vmPFC and dmPFC, previous reports have suggested
that there is a dorsal to ventral gradient for modeled and
executed value functions along the mPFC (Nicolle et al.,
2012). If our subjects are engaging in predictive forecast-
ing (i.e. modeling) of Player B’s responses to their trans-
fers and decisions are taken (i.e. executed) on the basis of
these models, then this could explain why we find activity
correlated with the amount kept in both ventral and dorsal
portions of mPFC. However, further experiments will be
necessary to test this speculative hypothesis.
One limitation of the current dataset is that there were a
relatively small number of choices for each participant per
condition (n " 12). Therefore, it is possible that future
studies including more choices per participant, and thus
having greater power, will find additional changes in
vmPFC connectivity associated with social strategic
decision-making.
Decisions that balance welfare for self with the impacts
on and reactions of others to one’s own choices are
ubiquitous in social life. Our results provide insights into
the neural mechanisms underlying such behavior and
suggest a key role for interactions between TPJ and
vmPFC. These findings are an important advance in our
understanding of the neurobiology underlying strategic
social choice and provide a basis for future investigations
into this central aspect of human behavior.
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Appendix B
Manuscript for study 2: Model
based brain substrates of
fairness and money
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B.1 Introduction
Choices, especially those directly involving social factors, are influenced by
numerous individual and context specific variables. Converging evidence
from decision making studies across fields such as biology, economics, psychol-
ogy, and neuroscience suggest that humans and other animals can integrate
multiple attributes including rewards, punishments, costs, temporal delays,
etc. into representations of the predicted value for each decision option using
cognitive mechanisms and neural circuits that are at least partially overlap-
ping across the domains of primary, secondary, and social goods (Chib et al.
2009; Basten et al. 2010; Hare et al. 2010; Bartra et al. 2013). The Ulti-
matum game (UG; Gth et al. 1982) is a widely used paradigm for studying
social decisions in which monetary gain and fairness (i.e. equality) attributes
both play important roles in determining players choices (see Methods; Fehr
and Camerer 2007). The finding that people do not behave according to the
Nash equilibrium (Mailath 1998) predicted by assumptions of purely selfish
preferences in the UG is extremely robust (List 2007; Slonim and Roth 1998;
Cameron 1999; Andersen et al. 2011). However, the precise proportion of
the total amount proposers o↵er and responders are willing to accept varies
across both individuals and choice contexts, indicating that expressed social
preferences are malleable and at least partially state-dependent (Chang and
Sanfey 2013; Wright et al. 2011; Sanfey 2009; Ho↵man et al. 2000; Henrich
et al. 2001; Andersen et al. 2011).
Previous UG experiments have shown that both recent experience and
cognitive strategies can a↵ect participants behavior and neural activity. For
example, the same ultimatum is more likely to be accepted if presented fol-
lowing a string of less equitable o↵ers than in the context of more equitable
o↵ers, and both objective and contextual aspects of fairness are reflected in
the insula (Wright et al. 2011). The inferred intention behind the proposal is
another type of context that a↵ects responders accept/reject decisions (Falk
et al. 2008). Using the explicit cognitive strategy of reappraising the inten-
tions of the proposer as more negative or positive has been shown to recruit
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity and to decrease and increase o↵er
acceptance rates, respectively (Wout et al. 2010; Grecucci et al. 2013). Ex-
ogenously altering lateral PFC activity via transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) also changes the acceptance rate of unfair o↵ers, despite leaving the
fairness judgments of those o↵ers unchanged (Knoch et al. 2006; Baumgart-
ner et al. 2011). Even simple suggestions to consider the other players actions
alter Ultimatum game behavior. When prompting proposers to consider re-
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sponders expectations and subsequent responses, Ho↵man and colleagues
(2000) found a significant increase in o↵er magnitudes, while Anderson and
colleagues (2011) were able to elicit reduced o↵er magnitudes from proposers
using instructions that indicated rational responders should accept any non-
zero o↵er. These findings suggest that choice contexts and attentional frames
have a substantial impact on participants decision making processes during
social interactions.
Recent work has utilized sequential sampling models (SSMs) to examine
social decision making processes and provided novel insights into interper-
sonal behavior. Originally applied to perceptual and categorization tasks,
sequential sampling models have been extended to the domain of value-based
choices (Forstmann et al. 2016), and more recently social decision making.
Thus far, SSMs have been shown to account for behavior in both two-person
asset allocation decisions (e.g. UG) and charitable donation decisions (Kra-
jbich et al. 2015; Hutcherson et al. 2015). In fact, it has been shown that
the parameters of an SSM fit to decisions over primary rewards for self in
one sample of participants can accurately predict the choices and reaction
times of a separate group of participants playing in the role of responder in
the UG (Krajbich et al. 2015). Critically, a parameter capturing the di↵er-
ence in the decision weights placed on visually fixated relative to non-fixated
food items was assumed to apply to payo↵s for oneself relative to the other
player when making the out-of-sample predictions about UG behavior. The
successful translation of a model capturing the influence of visual fixation, a
proxy for attention, on food choice into the domain of interpersonal decision
making suggests that attention or cognitive focus also plays an important
role interpersonal social choices.
Here, we tested the hypothesis that simple cues directing the respon-
ders initial focus towards either the potential monetary gain or fairness of
the outcome would alter decision making and its underlying neural activity
during the Ultimatum game. We measured blood oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) signals using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while
human participants made decisions about unfair ultimatums under choice
conditions that directed participants initial focus towards o↵er magnitude or
equality. Ultimatum acceptance rates increased in the money condition and
decreased in the fairness focus condition relative to control trials. We esti-
mated the parameters of an SSM to capture the changes in choice patterns
and reaction times across the three conditions and then used these context-
specific parameters to identify brain regions that represented decision signals
in favor of accepting or rejecting an o↵er. Overall, a set of brain regions in-
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cluding anterior cingulate cortex (aCC), dorsomedial frontal cortex (dmFC)
and bilateral insula were similarly active during responders choices across the
three conditions, but the degree to which BOLD signals were associated with
monetary gains and fairness levels changed across choice contexts. These re-
sults provide further evidence for the brains ability to flexibly incorporate
various outcome attributes (e.g. personal gain, equality) into integrated de-
cision values as a function of environmental and individual states.
B.2 Materials and methods
B.2.1 Participants
In total, 34 healthy, right-handed adults performed our ultimatum game
while undergoing fMRI scanning. Participants were screened for fMRI con-
traindications including acute medical conditions and psychiatric or neuro-
logical illness. All participants provided written informed consent in accor-
dance with the human participants committee in Zurich. Ten participants
were excluded from all behavioral and fMRI analyses because their choices
(accept, reject) did not meet our a priori criterion for choice variation (each
response must be chosen on at least 10 % of trials), leaving 24 participants
for all analyses.
B.2.2 Behavioral paradigm
Participants played a modified Ultimatum Game. This game consisted of two
players: player A who was endowed with a sum of money and was able to o↵er
a portion of this endowment to player B. Player B was then given the option
to accept the o↵er or reject it, causing the whole endowment to be returned
to the experimenter. We used fMRI scanning while subjects playing the role
of player B evaluated 54 di↵erent ultimatum o↵ers. The modification to
the original Ultimatum game consisted of an attentional focus manipulation.
Every o↵er was repeated over three focus conditions (Money, Fairness and
Natural), presented as blocks of 9 trials (162 trials in total; Figure B.1)). One
trial was selected at random to be the one that counted for the participants
payo↵. The total endowment varied on each trial in order to minimize the
correlation (r = 0.40) between monetary amount o↵ered and the fairness
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of the ultimatums. During the task, subjects had 3 seconds to accept or
reject a given o↵er, and were informed that missed trials would be treated
as rejections.
B.2.3 Behavioral analyses
We analyzed participants decision processes in each condition using a hier-
archical Drift Di↵usion Model that allowed us to model both reaction times
and choice outcomes. To this end, we estimated a drift di↵usion model for
each condition, where the outcomes were accept or reject, and the starting
bias and input function to the drift rate were allowed to vary. The input
function was a linear combination of an intercept term, z-scored magnitude
and fairness where the weights on each term were allowed to vary across con-
ditions and subjects. The hierarchical estimation method used allowed us
to consider each condition as a plate containing individual trial parameters,
while conserving dependencies on other drift di↵usion parameters assumed
to be constant within a subject across conditions. Across subjects, the bias
term and each of the weights on the input function to the drift rate was sig-
nificantly greater than the null distribution. Similar to the logistic regression,
there was a greater e↵ect of o↵er magnitude in the money focus condition,
and a greater e↵ect of o↵er fairness in the fairness focus compared to the
other conditions.
B.2.4 fMRI data acquisition
Images were acquired using a Philips Achieva 3T whole-body scanner with
an eight-channel sensitivity-encoding head coil (Philips Medical Systems) at
the Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research, University Hospital
Zrich. Stimuli were presented to subjects using the MATLAB 2012b toolbox;
Psychophysics Toolbox Software (Psychtoolbox 3.0, Brainard 1997) running
on a stimulus PC that was connected to both a projector and a 932 interface
& power supply (Current Design). This interface was also linked to a 4-
button diamond fiber optic response pad and the scan computer to register
scan pulses sent at the beginning of each volume acquisition. The paradigm
was presented via a back-projection system mounted on the head coil. T2*
weighted echo-planar images (EPIs) were acquired (34 slices per volume,
Field of View 200 x 104.8 x 200 mm, slice thickness 2.5 mm, .6 mm gap,
in-plane resolution 2.5*2.5 mm, matrix 80*80, repetition time 2000 ms, echo
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time 30 ms, flip angle 77) and a SENSE reduction factor of 2. Volumes
were acquired slice by slice in the axial orientation and ascending order at a
+15 degree tilt to the line between the anterior and posterior commissures.
In total, 390 volumes were collected over two experimental runs with five
dummy volumes acquired at the start of each run to help mitigate the e↵ect
of scanner warm up. A T1 weighted turbo field echo structural image was
acquired in sagittal orientation for each participant at the end of the scanning
session (181 slices, Field of View 256 x 256 x 181 mm, slice thickness 1 mm,
no gap, in-plane resolution 1*1 mm, matrix 256*256, repetition time 8.4 ms,
echo time 3.89 ms, flip angle 8). B0/B1 maps of the phase and magnitude
of the magnetic field were also derived from a fast field echo sequence (short
echo time = 4.29 ms, long echo time = 7.4 ms) acquired prior to the first
run of EPI volumes. Structural scans were coregistered to their mean EPIs
and averaged together to permit anatomical localization of the functional
activations at the group level. We measured breathing frequency and took
an electrocardiogram with the in-built system of the scanner in order to
correct for physiological noise.
B.2.5 fMRI analyses
The first GLM (GLM-D1) was computed in order to test for an overall e↵ect
of the drift rate. All trials were modelled as boxcars with onsets as the deci-
sion screen began and durations equal to the reaction time of that decision
(missed trials were modeled with a duration of three seconds) convolvd with
a canonical haemodynamic response function. The regressor of interest in
GLM-D1 was the drift rate for all trials where a decision was made. In ad-
dition, dummy regressors were included for all trials as well as for rejected,
money focus, fair focus and missed trials. These were included in order to ac-
count for potentially di↵erential main e↵ects associated with behaviour and
conditions during the experiment. A dummy regressor for the instruction
screens was also included with onsets at the start of the instruction screen
with a duration of five seconds.
A second GLM (GLM-AC) was also computed to examine the e↵ects
of fairness and money in the attention conditions (AC) more closely. The
dummy regressors were designed in a similar way to GLM-D1, but instead
of a dummy regressor with all trials, one was included for the control trials
alone. GLM-AC did not test drift rate regressors, but used the money and
fairness presented in the decisions instead, split into separate regressors for
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the attention conditions of money, fairness and control. Thus six parametric
regressors were included in GLM-AC, three for the money correlation in each
condition and three for the fairness correlation in each condition.
Finally, a second GLM (GLM-D2) was computed to further explore the
relationship between the drift rate and BOLD activity. Since drift rate is
related to accepting an o↵er, GLM-D2 split the drift rate regressor from
GLM-D1 into accepted and rejected trials in order to test them separately.
The dummy regressors were similar to GLM-D1, except for the dummy re-
gressor for all trials being replaced with two dummy regressors for accepted
and rejected trials.
Six motion regressors were added to each GLM before being computed
using the SPM 8 software at the indivdual subject level. Group level non-
parametric analysis was carried out using the FSL randomise function (Win-
kler et al. 2014) combining threshold free cluster enhancement (Smith and
Nichols 2009) with 5000 permutations of the data to determine a null distri-
bution for voxel-wise multiple comparisons correction and achieve statistical
significance levels of p < 0.05 at the whole brain level.
B.3 Results
B.3.1 Behavioral
Participants choice behavior was similar to that reported in previous studies
using the ultimatum game (C. F. Camerer 2003; Fehr and Camerer 2007).
Note that all o↵ers in our experiment were less than 50% of the total pot (i.e.
unfair) and ranged in relative equality from 10 to 30% of the total pot. The
mean acceptance rate for all o↵ers in the baseline condition collapsing across
both monetary gain and equality levels was 43.2% (95% highest density inter-
val (HDI) = [35.1, 51.6]). Participants willingness to accept the unfair o↵ers
changed when explicitly focusing on money or equality before making their
choices. When focusing on money, participants acceptance rates increased
by 8.9% (95% HDI = [3.1, 14.3], posterior probability of an increase greater
than 0 = 99.8%). In contrast, when focusing on equality, participants accep-
tance rates decreased by 4.2% (95% HDI = [-8.0, -0.5], posterior probability
of a decrease greater than 0 = 98.7%).
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We examined the influence of o↵er magnitudes and relative equality on
choices and RTs in each condition using a Bayesian hierarchical drift di↵u-
sion modeling approach. The drift di↵usion model (DDM) is a specific form
of sequential sampling model that takes as input the relative evidence for
each option and accumulates this evidence over time until reaching a de-
cision boundary. Within our modeling framework, the relative evidence is
computed as a function of the o↵er magnitude and equality on each trial. We
initially compared two DDM models, one in which the coe cients weight-
ing the influence of o↵er magnitude and equality on drift rate (i.e. relative
evidence accumulation) and all other DDM parameters were constant for
all trials and another in which the drift-rate coe cients and all other DDM
parameters could vary in the three conditions, Money, Equality and Base-
line. Model comparison based on the deviance information criterion (DIC)
showed that the condition specific drift-rate model provided the best fit to
the data (constant model DIC = 551690; condition specific model DIC =
346776; lower DIC indicates a better fit). The drift rate alone predicted sub-
ject responses 75% of the time and Figure B.2 shows the alignment between
RT patterns predicted by our DDM and participants behavior. Comparisons
of the coe cients reflecting the influence of o↵er magnitude and equality
on choices in each condition revealed that o↵er magnitude had more impact
during the Money focus condition relative to both neutral focus and Baseline
trials, while the influence of equality was greater when the initial focus was
directed towards the fairness attribute (Figure B.3). The drift-rate coe -
cients and bias di↵ered significantly across choice conditions (tables B.1 and
B.2).
B.3.2 fMRI
We first tested for associations between BOLD signals and the trial-specific
drift rates estimated from choices and RTs at the behavioral level using the
model labeled GLM-D1 in the Methods section. This model included a single
onset for all trials regardless of decision or condition and a parametric regres-
sor equal to the drift rate on each trial. This drift regressor identified regions
that reflected an integration of each trials monetary and fairness attributes
because the rate of evidence accumulation (drift) in our DDM varies as a
function of the trial-specific o↵er equality levels and magnitudes as well as
the choice context (Baseline, Fairness or Money conditions). Multiple brain
regions exhibited a BOLD signal that correlated positively with the regressor
for drift rate, including the amygdala, dlPFC, dorsal and ventral portions of
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the medial PFC, fronto-polar cortex, insula (anterior and mid), precuneus,
parietal cortex, thalamus, and ventral striatum (Figure B.4a; Table B.3).
Note that within our modeling framework, the drift rate is proportional to
the evidence in favor of accepting over rejecting the proposed monetary split.
A specification of the drift-di↵usion model allowing for condition specific
changes in the influence of o↵er magnitudes and fairness provided the best
fit to the participants pattern of accept and reject decisions. Thus, varia-
tion in the e↵ects of magnitude and fairness on choice is captured by the
parametric regressor for drift-rate. To visualize the di↵erential associations
between BOLD activity and o↵er magnitude or fairness as a function of the
attentional focus condition, we extracted the regression coe cients from a
another model (GLM-AC) in selected functional ROIs identified by GLM-
D1. GLM-AC included separate onsets for trials in each attention condition
(AC) and parameteric regressors for the o↵er magnitude and fairness on each
trial. To select voxels correlated with the drift rate regressor from GLM-D2
in an unbiased fashion, we split our data into two halves and computed the
group-level contrast for drift rate in accept versus reject decisions in each
half separately. We then extracted the regression coe cients representing
the associations between o↵er magnitude or fairness and BOLD activity for
each half of the sample based on the ROIs identified in the other half (see
Method for further details). Figure B.4b shows the di↵erential representa-
tions of o↵er magnitude and fairness in regions dmFC, frontal polar cortex
and vmPFC as a function of the attention condition.
Similarly to previous literature, we tested areas of the brain exhibiting
di↵erenctial BOLD activity when accepting and rejecting in GLM-D2. Con-
sistent with previous neuroimaging and transcranial stimulation studies, we
found that accepting the unfair o↵ers that were presented was associated with
increased activity in several brain regions (Figure B.5a; Table B.4) includ-
ing the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), anterior insula, supra-
marginal gyrus and striatum (putamen and caudate). On the other hand, the
left temporal parietal junction and superior temporal sulcus showed greater
BOLD signal when participants decided to reject the o↵er (Figure B.5b; table
B.5).
Finally, using the same model (GLM-D2), we tested for brain regions
that di↵erentially represented the evidence for accepting the ultimatum as a
function of the choice the participant ultimately made using a second model
(GLM-D2) that split the trials into separate regressors according to par-
ticipants accept and reject decisions. The contrast for drift rate in Accept
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greater than Reject trials showed significant di↵erences in regions such as
vmPFC, striatum, and posterior cingulate cortex (see Table B.6) that have
been shown to correlate with stimulus values for a wide range of goods and
experiences (Bartra et al. 2013; Clithero and Rangel 2014) and to adapt
value representations for multi-attribute stimuli according to context or at-
tentional cues (Nicolle et al. 2012; Hare et al. 2011a; Rudorf and Hare 2014).
Separate examinations of the Accept and Reject trials alone revealed that
many regions displayed a negative association with drift rate (i.e. the relative
evidence to accept the proposal) during trials in which participants chose to
reject the o↵er (Figure B.6; Table B.7). This negative relationship between
the drift rate and BOLD signals suggests that activity in these regions may
reflect the evidence in favor of rejecting the o↵er.
B.4 Discussion
In this study, we used a modified ultimatum game in order to separate factors
relating to fairness and monetary concerns. The primary aim was to examine
the decision making process that balances these factors and potential neural
mechanisms that support it. To this end, a DDM framework was applied to
a two alternative choice ultimatum game. To test whether this model was
sensitive to intra-individual weights on the fairness and monetary concerns, a
simple framing manipulation was used. The resulting drift rate per decision
led to an integrated measure of the decision variable which was tested against
the BOLD data at the time of decision making.
Central to the question of how social decisions are made, is how di↵er-
ent options can be compared when their attributes seem radically di↵erent,
e.g. how much money is spending time with family worth? In the ultima-
tum game, the question is reduced to weighing financial gain against fairness
(note that since we used only unfair o↵ers, this is proportional to inequality).
The DDM allows us to fit a single process to empirical data with quantita-
tively changing monetary gain and fairness. Using a hierarchical estimation
of DDM parameters allowed us to not only make trial level fits of model
parameters, but also to pool evidence for di↵erent framing conditions. Thus
di↵erent parameters were fit to baseline, money and fairness conditions. Test-
ing the model parameters over these conditions revealed that several aspects
of the DDM was sensitive to these e↵ects, including the bias and evidence
required to accept an o↵er. The input function to the drift rate also revealed
greater weights on the monetary gain factor when in the money frame and a
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greater weight on the fairness factor when in the fairness frame.
These results demonstrate that attentional cues can influence social de-
cision making. and suggest that this e↵ect can be captured by a DDM. This
e↵ect was expected given previous results that have changed the framing of
objectively similar o↵ers (Wright et al. 2011). Several studies have demon-
strated that the perception of fairness can be decoupled from its e↵ects on
behaviour. This appears to be true whether the manipulation is based on
framing (Wright et al. 2011), altering neurotransmitter levels (Crockett et al.
2008) or directly interfering with neural activity (Knoch et al. 2006). This
suggests that there may be a di↵erence between a more abstract knowledge
of fairness and how it is evaluated and integrated into social decision making.
In this study we observed the latter e↵ect.
Using the DDM fit, the trial by trial information was captured in the
changing drift rate. This was used to correlate the BOLD activity at the
time of these decisions. By testing the correlation of BOLD with drift rate
when accepting, minus the drift rate when rejecting, it appears that the
BOLD signal increases strongly in relation to the decision variable driving
towards the decision that will be made. Seeing this throughout the medial
frontal cortex ties in with other research on regions of the brain that relate
to the value integration of a choice (Hare et al. 2011a; Nicolle et al. 2012;
Rudorf and Hare 2014). Together with the BOLD correlations with drift
rate when rejecting the unfair o↵ers presented in this study, it appears that
ultimatum game rejections may be rational and consistent when including
fairness concerns.
While the DDM has been previously applied to value based decision mak-
ing in a social context (Krajbich et al. 2015), our study shows how this mech-
anism may be supported by neural processes. This is of particular interest
from an economic perspective, as it adds weight to the argument that eco-
nomic decisions should be described with process models in order to better
understand how and when choices will be sensitive to specific contextual fac-
tors. Building on this research, it may be possible to develop parsimonious
models to describe the process of satisficing over multiple domains, helping
to solve problems involving bounded rationality(Munier et al. 1999).
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B.6 Tables
Table B.1: Di↵erential DDM parameter coe cients across condi-
tions
Drift Coe cient Condition t value p value
O↵er
money>fairness 13.92 1.08⇥ 10 12
money>baseline 12.38 1.188⇥ 10 11
Percentage o↵er
fairness>money 7.59 1.05⇥ 10 7
fairness>baseline 4.73 9.15⇥ 10 5
Table B.2: ANOVA for DDM parameters over condition factors
Drift Parameter F value p value
alpha 4.28 0.0177
beta 5.74 0.00495
theta 0.344 0.710
intercept 6.78 0.002054
o↵er 113 2.2⇥ 10 16
fairness 28.7 8.34⇥ 10 10
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Table B.3: Regions correlating with drift rate across the whole
brain
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
1930 Accumbens R 8 13 -3.5 7.19
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 48 33 21.3 4.22
825 Cingulate Gyrus L/R 10.5 43 12 4.93
Paracingulate Gyrus L/R 3 10.5 55.4 4.17
252 Frontal Orbital Cortex L -29.5 28 -0.4 7.10
251 Occipital Cortex L -29.5 -59.5 49.2 4.63
117 Lingual Gyrus L/R 3 -62 2.7 4.90
113 Thalamus L/R 3 -14.5 -6.6 6.47
33 Precuneous Cortex L -17 -69.5 39.9 4.61
13 Occipital Cortex R 38 -69.5 33.7 4.90
12 Precuneous Cortex L/R -2 -72 52.3 3.35
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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Table B.4: Regions with increased BOLD activity when accepting
than when rejecting across the whole brain
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
194 Supramarginal Gyrus R 48 -32 46.1 6.48
153 Occipital Cortex L -22 -62 36.8 6.19
107 Putamen R 20.5 8 5.8 5.57
102 Middle Frontal Gyrus R 43 33 27.5 4.54
52 Precentral Gyrus R 53 13 30.6 4.54
21 Occipital Cortex R 28 -62 55.4 4.98
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
Table B.5: Regions with increased BOLD activity when rejecting
than when accepting across the whole brain
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
63 Angular Gyrus L -42 -52 27.5 5.80
41 Middle Temporal Gyrus L -59.5 -39.5 2.7 5.54
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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Table B.6: Regions correlating with drift rate when accepting -
drift rate when rejecting across the whole brain
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
18380 Angular Gyrus R 50.5 -59.5 33.7 5.50
Occipital Cortex L -39.5 -64.5 27.5 4.75
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus L/R 3 -37 30.6 4.72
Fusiform Cortex R 43 -49.5 -19 4.82
Occipital Pole R 10.5 -89.5 24.4 3.83
Frontal Pole R 18 68 5.8 5.39
Middle Temporal Gyrus L -64.5 -37 -9.7 4.94
Middle Frontal Gyrus R 30.5 25.5 49.2 6.31
Frontal Medial Cortex L -9.5 35.5 -22.1 4.85
Frontal Pole L -47 48 8.9 4.49
Amygdala R 20.5 -4.5 -19 5.57
Superior Frontal Gyrus L -24.5 20.5 46.1 4.92
Inferior Frontal Gyrus R 58 30.5 -3.5 3.86
70 Middle Temporal Gyrus R 60.5 0.5 -25.2 4.83
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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Table B.7: Regions negatively correlating with drift rate when
rejecting across the whole brain
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
1748 Occipital Cortex L 48 -67 33.7 6.14
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus L/R -4.5 -47 33.7 5.13
Occipital Cortex L -37 -87 15.1 3.67
733 Frontal Pole L -7 58 30.6 4.79
Frontal Medial Cortex L -7 38 -22.1 5.43
335 Postcentral Gyrus R 65.5 -2 30.6 4.75
332 Occipital Cortex L -49.5 -67 27.5 6.22
44 Frontal Pole L/R 13 70.5 12 4.71
34 Frontal Pole R 35.5 38 -6.6 5.68
33 Middle Temporal Gyrus R 68 -37 -3.5 4.16
21 Subcallosal Cortex L/R 3 15.5 -9.7 4.49
13 Fusiform R 33 -29.5 -22.1 4.85
11 Frontal Pole L -39.5 53 -0.4 3.67
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. T values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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B.7 Figure Legends
Figure B.1: Subjects completed a mini-block design task. The three condi-
tions of the mini-blocks (a, b and c) are shown with the instruction, fixation
and decision screens. The fixation and decision screens were repeated nine
times per mini-block.
Figure B.2: Correlation (r = 0.44) between recorded reaction times and
simulated reaction times based on the DDM model.
Figure B.3: boundary, non-decision time, bias and input function weights
for the DDM fits for each condition, across subjects.
Figure B.4: Panel a) shows BOLD activity relating to the drift rate from
GLM-D1 (across all trials). Panel b) uses ROIs from the analyis in a) to
examine the drift rate in money, fairness and baseline conditions from GLM-
AC. relate to the with BOLD activation positively correlating with drift rate
across all trials. All voxels are shown at p < 0.05 familywise error corrected.
Image shown in radiological space at MNI coordinates ( 4, 23, 1).
Figure B.5: Panels (a) and (b) show brain regions where BOLD activity
was di↵erentially correlated with the drift rate during trials in which the
o↵er was accepted versus rejected. The warm color scale in a)represents
voxels where the correlation with the trial-wise drift rate is more positive
in accept relative to reject trials. The cool color scale in b) represents vox-
els where the correlation with the trial-wise drift rate is stronger in reject
trials relative to accept trials. All voxels are shown at p < 0.05 familywise
error corrected. The brain images are shown in radiological space at MNI
coordinates (8, 10, 1)
Figure B.6: BOLD activation negatively correlating with drift rate in
trials where the o↵er was rejected. All voxels are shown at p < 0.05 family-
wise error corrected. Image shown in radiological space at MNI coordinates
(1, 56, 6).
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C.1 Introduction
A key feature of human behaviour is our capacity for altruism. This describes
a range of motivations and behaviours that lead to a net benefit to other in-
dividuals from our own actions. although altruism was defined over a century
ago (Beesly 1875), it has become an active subject of study in psychology
(Berkowitz 1972; Schwartz 1977; Batson and Moran 1999) and economics (Si-
mon 1993; Andreoni 1990; Glazer and Konrad 1996) in the last few decades.
Much work has been done on the taxonomy of altruistic behaviour in the
psychological literature (see Feigin et al. 2014, for a systematic review), dif-
ferentiating principally between pure altruism (no net benefit ot the self)
and impure altruism (a net gain to the self as well as the other). These two
types of altruism are then subdivided into several explicatory factors such as
the role of emotion or expectations of reciprocity. The econonomic literature
has taken a broadly similar path (Kagel and Roth 2016), but with more of
an emphasis creating formal models to describe and explain the behaviour
(Hubbard et al. 2016; Gino et al. 2016). In this paper, we restrict ourselves
to one of the most prevalent forms of altruism, but also one of the most dif-
ficult to explain: charitable donation. This is often considered to be a pure
altruism because the reputation and reciprocity e↵ects can be controlled for,
although it is possible that a ‘warm glow’ from charitable giving may deliver
a primary reward to the subjects.
The primary goal of this paper is to better understand the low-level mech-
anisms that support these charitable decisions. This is an important step in
understanding how altruistic concerns interact with other forms of value. Re-
cent evidence suggests that interactions with wealth, goods and e↵ort have
di↵erent e↵ects on the altruistic motive (Holmes et al. 2002; Strahilevitz
1999; Mayo and Tinsley 2009). One approach to shed light on the mech-
anisms underlying these interactions is to apply methods from neuroeco-
nomics. Mounting evidence suggests that areas of the brain such as frontal
cortex and striatum are vital to making value based decisions (Hare et al.
2010; Clithero and Rangel 2014). Several studies have used these methods
in order to test whether there may be biological substrates of aspects of
economic games such as the dictator game where there is an option to give
money to another player who otherwise would not receive anything or chari-
table donations. For example (Izuma et al. 2009) found that being observed
while deciding whether to donate to charity or keep the money for oneself
increased charitable giving for di cult choices and that donating while under
observation lead to a greater activation of the ventral striatum.
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In this study, we present work where subjects could either keep an en-
dowment, or donate to charities to or products they could buy in a task
similar to the SHOP task (Knutson et al. 2007). This decision is considered
as a tradeo↵ between the amount that the option is worth (willingness to
pay, WTP), and the price o↵ered for the option. Thus, this simplistic model
of a value decision can be explored in two conditions - donating and buying,
and the biological substrates of the attributes of the decision can be tested
in either case. Here we present a functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) study where the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) can be
observed and tested against the experimental variables. Since there are mul-
tiple attributes that might need to be integrated in one region for a decision
to take place, it has been proposed that local multivariate methods may aid
in modeling these e↵ects (Kahnt et al. 2011). Thus, in this study we apply a
recently developed method, cross validated multivariate analysis of variance
(cvMANOVA, Allefeld and Haynes 2014) to this data.
cvMANOVA is the multivariate (i.e. multiple dependant variables) ex-
tension of a standard analysis of variance, which subsequently applies a cross
validation approach to reduce the extent of bias in the test statistic. This
test statistic may be treated similarly to the univariate GLM test statistics
commonly found in fMRI analyses. When applied to a fMRI searchlight anal-
ysis (Kriegeskorte et al. 2006), a sphere of BOLD voxel responses constitute
the dependant variables and the design matrix contains the experimental
manipulations. Fitting this model is slightly di↵erent to the univariate case,
as covariance across the dependant variables (as in the case of the spatially
near voxels in the searchlight) may lead to elliptical distributions of a class of
data points in the dependant variable space. Therefore, fitting the dependant
variables given a class membership might need to use di↵erent weights for dif-
ferent parameters relating to di↵erent dependant variables. In cvMANOVA,
this is solved by using the Mahalanobis distance, a statistic that allows for
each class distribution to have di↵erent covariance structure in the dependant
variable space. This statistic is used to di↵erentiate the hypothesis (i.e. the
full model) multivariate distribution from the null multivariate distribution
(i.e. the reduced model). In order to ensure that the unexplained variance
does not contain any structure associated with the experimental variables,
it is important to include all explanatory variables in the regression model.
In this study, we apply this method to test models containing proposed in-
tegrated decision values, di↵erential encoding of decision attributes and the
stability of these attributes across conditions, a process often known as cross-
decoding.
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C.2 Methods
C.2.1 Experiment
Nineteen subjects took part in the fMRI study, of which sixteen were used for
the analysis (one subject did not complete the study and two subjects had
no variation in behaviour, meaning behavioural models could not be fit to
their data). Prior to scanning, subjects were told that they had received an
endowment of 100 US dollars before starting the experiment. They then read
the experiment instructions and completed a pre-scan rating task in which
they rated charities and household items by how much they were willing to
pay (WTP) for them from their endowment. WTPs were elicited using a
Becker de Groot auction which had been carefully explained in the instruc-
tions. In the scanner, subjects were presented with the same images that
they had rated, in a random order. The image was presented alongside a
label describing the charity or product and a price that they would need to
pay in order to receive the item. Prices were selected from a normal distribu-
tion around the mean WTPs from a previous pilot data set using the same
stimuli. Subjects then read the instructions for the fMRI experiment and
began 4 runs of the fMRI task while undergoing fMRI scanning.
C.2.2 fMRI experiment
The functional imaging was conducted using a Siemens (Erlangen, Germany)
3.0 Tesla Trio MRI scanner to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar
(EPI) images with BOLD contrast. Slices were oriented at 30 to the anterior
commissureposterior commissure line. A Siemens eight-channel phased array
coil was used to increase the BOLD signal. Each volume comprised 40 axial
slices collected in an ascending manner. Data were collected in four sessions
where the length of each session 586 volumes (24.4 min). The imaging pa-
rameters were as follows: echo time, 30ms; field of view, 192mm; in-plane
resolution and slice thickness, 3mm; slice gap 0.3mm; repetition time, 2.5s.
Whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1x1x1 mm) were
acquired from the 19 subjects and coregistered with their mean EPI images
and averaged together to permit anatomical localization of the functional
activations at the group level.
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C.2.3 fMRI preprocessing
Image analysis was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imag-
ing Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Images were motion
corrected with realignment to the mean volume, spatially normalized to the
standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template. Intensity normal-
ization and high-pass temporal filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) were
also applied to the data.
C.2.4 fMRI GLMs
In order to address the e↵ects of an integrated value representation including
the e↵ect of the subject choice, a design matrix: GLM-1 was used. This
included a parametric regressor was derived taking the (WTP - price) con-
ditional on accepting the price (i.e. net value gained) and (price-WTP)
conditional on refusing the item (i.e. net value lost). This regressor had
onsets and durations aligned with the corresponding decision period as well
as a boxcar regressor also with these onsets and durations.
In addition, in order to test the di↵erent ways that decision features were
encoded for each charity and purchase choice, we created a design matrix:
GLM-2. This included the main e↵ect, WTP and price. As such, the design
matrix was constructed with two dummy boxcar regressors for the charity
and product conditions, with an onset for each purchase screen with duration
equal to the reaction time and then convolved with a canonical haemody-
namic response function. In addition, for each condition two more boxcar
regressors were added with their amplitude modulated by the parameters
for WTP and price. All GLMs included the motion regressors and dummy
variables for the onset and duration of wach scan session. These GLMs were
estimated on individuals’ warped brains using SPM12.
These GLMs were used in a group level non-parametric analysis using
the FSL (Winkler et al. 2014) randomise function combining threshold free
cluster enhancement (Smith and Nichols 2009) with 5000 permutations of
the data to determine a null distribution for voxel-wise multiple comparisons
correction at the whole brain level.
GLM-1 and GLM-2 were also used for subsequent cvMANOVA analyses.
The searchlight radius was set to 3 voxels (124 voxels, volume 3.68cm3). As
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described in (Allefeld and Haynes 2014), for each subject, each of the four
runs was tested using parameters derived from a training dataset consisting
the remaining three runs. The average of these four folds was taken to be the
D test statistic and data were prepared for permutation testing by sign flip-
ping the training data (three runs leading to one true training data and seven
sign flipped training data for building a null distribution) for each subject.
These D-stat images were passed through a threshold free cluster enhance-
ment process (Smith and Nichols 2009) implemented via the MatlabTFCE
package and the resulting enhanced cluster images were used for all further
analysis. Null hypothesis testing was achieved using the permuted maximum
statistic method (Nichols and Holmes 2002). The null distribution was built
over 5000 iterations by randomly selecting one D-stat image based on the
sign flipped datasets per subject, taking the average across subjects and tak-
ing the maximum statistic in the resulting image per iteration. statistical
significance was derived from comparing the average true D-stat against the
null distribution.
C.3 Results
C.3.1 Behaviour
Prior to scanning, subjects completed a BDM auction to elict their WTP
for the products and charities that would appear in the experiment while
they were being scanned. The WTPs of charities and products were trend-
level significant (product WTP: 14.2 ±6.6 mean/SD, charity WTP: 8.8 ±8.2
mean/SD, 2 sample t-test p=0.050). However, a similar trend was observed in
the pilot data and prices were chosen as to o↵set the impact of this di↵erence.
As such, during scanning, the average di culty (defined as —WTP-price—)
of product and charity trials was not significantly di↵erent (product di -
culty: 16.3 ±2.8 mean/SD, charity di culty: 15.2 ±5.2 mean/SD, 2 sample
t-test p=0.455). This was achieved despite the prices being not significantly
di↵erent (product prices: 22.9 ±0.57 mean/SD, charity prices: 20.5 ±4.56
mean/SD, 2 sample t-test p=0.551). As expected, given that the average
prices were higher than the average willingness to pay, subjects accepted the
price only 33.5% of the time and this did not di↵er significantly betweeen the
conditions (product buying fraction: 0.36 ±0.14 mean/SD, charity buying
fraction: 0.31 ±0.29 mean/SD, 2 sample t-test p=0.618). Finally, subjects
responded to price in a utility maximising manner based on their WTP 83%
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of the time, significantly above 50% chance (one sample t-test p=0.00292
against a mean of 50%) and this was not significantly di↵erent between con-
ditions (product percentage correct: 83.5 ±4.3 mean/SD, charity percentage
correct: 82.6 ±13.6 mean/SD, 2 sample t-test p=0.810).
C.3.2 fMRI
Based on GLM-1, the integrated decision value was tested against the BOLD
signal using mass univariate (with fsl’s randomise) and multivariate (with
the cvMANOVA framework) analyses. The univariate approach showed the
BOLD signal in anterior cingulate cortex correlated negatively with the in-
tegrated decision variable, but only in product trials (table C.1). No signifi-
cant e↵ects were seen in the di↵erence of decision value correlation between
charity and product trials. In order to test whether there was a locally dis-
tributed representation, GLM-1 was also tested with cvMANOVA. First, the
integrated decision value was tested across all trials, to examine whether
cvMANOVA was sensitive to its e↵ect on BOLD. Significant pattern dis-
criminability was seen in large areas of the cortex, suggesting that locally
distributed processing in these areas can track the e↵ect of the integrated
decision value (figure C.3, table C.2). In addition, the di↵erence in this deci-
sion value between charity and product trials was tested with cvMANOVA,
revealing a significant voxels in areas on the left lateral frontal cortex (figure
C.4, table C.3), demonstrating that this value may be encoded di↵erentially
in these brain areas depending on the type of decision made.
Using GLM-2, the integrated decision value was broken up into price
and WTP, allowing for these attributes and their interactions to be tested
against the BOLD data. Similarly to the analysis approach with GLM-1,
both univariate and multivariate analyses were tested. Similar to GLM-
1, main e↵ects and di↵erences did not show significant e↵ects except for a
negtive correlation with price in the product condition alone (table C.4).
However, these significant voxels were largely in precuneous and postcentral
gyrus, suggesting that the individual contribution of price in this analysis
may be a di↵erent e↵ect to the integrated decision value seen in anterior
cingulate. cvMANOVA was also applied to GLM-2, using a 2x2 MANOVA
framework, where the voxels in the searchlight were predicted by two levels
of condition and two levels of decision attribute. This decision attribute
factor was tested against the BOLD signal across the brain and showed left
lateral frontal cortex (figure C.5, table C.5), although in di↵erent areas to
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the integrated decision result shown in figure C.4. One of the strengths of
the MANOVA framework is that it allows cross decoding where there may
be non-linear separation in the patterns exhibited. In GLM-2, we were able
to test the stability of the e↵ect of the attribute factor while accounting
for the e↵ects of the condition factor, i.e. decoding the attribute encoding
across conditions. Figure C.6 (table C.6) shows significant voxels in the
anterior cingulate cortex where the pattern of the attribute factor is stably
discriminated.
C.4 Discussion
In this paper, we presented a fMRI study where subjects made decisions in
charitable and product purchase contexts on whether to donate or buy at
a given price. The act of purchasing captures one of the most important
forms of decision making, in the formal exchange of personal resources for
a good. This is also a linchpin of market economics for establishing how
much a good is worth and what the correct price should be. This experiment
examined the two key components of this process, in the willingness to pay
and the price of a good. Although people can reveal their preferences through
the decisions they make, understanding the mechanisms underlying these
decisions can help form better inferences in novel situations. The charitable
and product contexts of this experiment sought to explore the common and
distinct mechanisms at play during purchase decisions. These mechanisms
were assessed by testing BOLD correlates of these parameters during the
decisions. A standard univariate approach showed that product decisions
led to more activity for cheaper o↵ers in the anterior cingulate and cuneous
for the integrated decision value and the price respectively. The anterior
cingulate has been implicated in several value-related functions (Kolling et
al. 2016), and may represent some aspect of integrated value. While these
results are not as strong as previous literature (Knutson et al. 2007), this may
be due to power issues - we entered 16 subjects into the analysis compared
to 26 in that study. The cuneous result is also often seen in the reward
literature (Bartra et al. 2013), although more anterior to what was seen in
this experiment. Again, this may be a power issue.
Considering the diverse range and complexity of the stimuli presented to
subjects, we hypothesised that neural substrates may be expressed in spa-
tially local but distinct areas. To this end a multivariate searchlight analysis
(cvMANOVA) was employed to capture the local patterns relating to the
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purchase decisions. First, this was used to assess the choice dependent value
of subjects choices that was common across both contexts. This approach
provided evidence that the integrated value is encoded in large areas includ-
ing dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and left premotor cortex. Considering that
subjects responded with their right hand for all trials, this is e↵ect may relate
to the value signal of a neural drift di↵usion model as seen previously (Hare
et al. 2011b). The distinctness of this choice dependant value between char-
itable and product contexts was also examined, with e↵ects seen in lateral
frontal cortex. In value based decision making, these regions have been asso-
ciated with self-control (Hare et al. 2009) and strategy (Spitzer et al. 2007).
Since the BOLD pattern is related to the choice value in this case, it may
be that di↵erent patterns of self control are deployed when assessing char-
itable and product stimuli. This may indicate that other-orientated value
and social norms exert di↵erent patterns of activity to a simple assessment
of worth, but further work would be required to support this claim.
In order to more directly examine the attributes of the stimuli indepen-
dent of choice, the cvMANOVA framework was applied to the WTP and
price attributes without accounting for the choice outcome. This revealed a
frontal lateral pattern, similar to that seen in the integrated value discrimi-
nating between contexts, but more anterior. If this pattern also relates to self
control, then there may be multiple levels of inhibitory mechanisms at play
during purchase decisions, some relating to the choice, but others relating
to the stimuli themselves. In addition, a common pattern was found across
charitable and product contexts in dorsal anterior cingulate that discrimi-
nated between the decision attributes. This area has been implicated in a
wide range of value-related behaviors, in particular those involving a degree
of conflict (Kolling et al. 2016), such as is seen in a purchase decision. This
e↵ect was seen to be stable in a cross decoding analysis where the pattern
based on the data from one context maps can be used in the other context.
However, this e↵ect was not seen in the interaction between condition and
decision attributes, so it is not likely to be related to di↵erent expressions of
the decision conflict between condition. Instead, it may relate to the tradeo↵
between WTP and price.
It should be noted that previous fMRI experiments in charitable dona-
tions have often found regions associated with value representation such as
ventral striatum (Moll et al. 2006) to be present. However, it should be
noted that in the above study, the results were presented uncorrected for
multiple comparisons and that the experiment was designed to test costly
vs. costless donations. Since in our study the donation is always costly, this
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may contribute to why that result is not present. Mechanisms of charitable
donation have also been stuied more recently, where the mechanisms relating
to empathy were examined. (Tusche et al. 2016). This found brain regions
more often related to mentalizing than value. While we also show a role for
anterior insula similar to theirs, our results relate to an integrated choice
value and stimulus attribute measure for both charity and products, whereas
Tusche et al. explained it as a measure of empathy for the charity solely in
the charitable domain. This would need to be tested in purchase decisions
in order to better distinguish the actual role of anterior insula in these value
decisions.
In sum, this study presents a development in understanding choice at-
tributes relating to decision making in charitable and personal contexts.
While this provides evidence for the inclusion of medial and lateral frontal
cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate and anterior insula, more research is required
to more fully relate these e↵ects to psychological phenomena. Further work
exploring the empathetic and normative contributions to charitable giving
might yield insights into how these attributes compare to similar strategic
concerns and social norms that a↵ect other domains of value based decision
making.
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C.6 Tables
Table C.1: Regions with a negative BOLD correlation with decision
value in product trials
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
20 Anterior Cingulate Cortex L/R -3 12 45 7.61
7 Anterior Cingulate Cortex L -6 30 36 11.88
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. t values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. These are significant at p <0.05
whole brain family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
Table C.2: Regions with a cvMANOVA pattern for decision value
across both charity and product decisions
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) D
4191 Precentral gyrus L -36 3 36 1.5⇥ 10 5
Temporal pole L -45 15 -12 1.4⇥ 10 5
Frontal pole R 21 51 27 1.6⇥ 10 5
Precentral gyrus R 57 9 9 1.9⇥ 10 5
Dorsofrontal gyrus R 15 12 60 1.2⇥ 10 5
238 Cuneous / precuneous L/R 0 -72 18 2.2⇥ 10 5
44 Postcentral gyrus R 51 -15 57 1.8⇥ 10 5
26 Superior temporal gyrus R 57 -57 6 1.9⇥ 10 5
5 Occipital cortex R 54 -63 -12 2.3⇥ 10 5
4 Cerebral white matter R 27 27 24 1.4⇥ 10 5
4 Frontal pole R 30 42 48 1.6⇥ 10 5
4 Frontal pole R 21 48 45 1.2⇥ 10 5
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. D values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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Table C.3: Regions with a cvMANOVA pattern that di↵erentiates
decision value encoding in charity from product decisions
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) D
106 Frontal pole L -42 42 24 2.4⇥ 10 5
66 Precentral gyrus L -42 3 45 1.8⇥ 10 5
58 Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L -24 39 48 1.9⇥ 10 5
37 Precentral gyrus L -54 -12 45 2.4⇥ 10 5
31 Supracalcine cortex L/R 3 -81 9 1.9⇥ 10 5
13 Medial frontal cortex L -33 24 27 1.7⇥ 10 5
4 Occipital cortex L -27 -96 12 2.6⇥ 10 5
1 Precentral gyrus L -48 0 54 1.5⇥ 10 5
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. D values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
Table C.4: Regions correlating BOLD with price in product trials
more than charity trials
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) t
18 Postcentral gyrus L -42 -33 54 5.31
4 Precuneous cortex L/R 0 -60 45 4.74
2 Precuneous cortex L/R -3 -69 51 4.62
1 Postcentral gyrus R 42 -33 48 6.31
1 Angular gyrus L -30 -60 57 6.07
1 Occipital cortex L -21 -66 60 5.98
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. D values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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Table C.5: Regions with a cvMANOVA pattern di↵erentiating
price and WTP for both charity and product decisions
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) D
299 Medial frontal gyrus L -42 3 36 4.1⇥ 10 5
35 Frontal pole L -24 42 48 4.2⇥ 10 5
24 Fusiform gyrus L -12 -75 -18 4.2⇥ 10 5
7 Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex L/R 3 48 48 4.2⇥ 10 5
1 Precuneous cortex L/R -6 -72 36 4.8⇥ 10 5
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. D values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
Table C.6: Regions with a cvMANOVA pattern of price and WTP
that is stable across charity and product decisions
Extent Region Hemisphere x(mm) y(mm) z(mm) D
6 Dorsal anterior cingulate L/R 0 24 36 5.8⇥ 10 5
Peak coordinates (x,y,z) are listed in MNI space. D values are test statistics
derived from 5000 permutations of the data. All regions are local cluster
peaks at least 50mm apart. These are significant at p <0.05 whole brain
family wise error corrected for multiple comparisons
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C.7 Figure Legends
Figure C.1: Subjects completed a buy / no buy task for charitable donations
and products in randomized order. The durations of each screen are shown
below each screenshot.
Figure C.2: Behavioural analysis showed no significant di↵erence in be-
haviour between the charity and product decisions, except for a in willing-
ness to pay (WTP), although the di culty of the decisions (as the unsigned
di↵erence between price and WTP) did not di↵er at time of decision.
Figure C.3: Pattern discriminablity of the integrated value of a decision
across all trials showed large areas of cortex, particularly in fronto-medial,
insula and cuneous regions. Image shown at MNI coordinates (1, 26, 14).
Figure C.4 Pattern discriminablity of the di↵erence in integrated value
between charity and oroduct decisions. Areas of left lateral prefrontal, left
lateral frontal cortex amd left precentral cortex showed significant pattern
discriminablity. Image shown at MNI coordinates ( 44, 39, 18).
Figure C.5 Pattern discriminablity of the di↵erence between willingness to
pay and price correlations across all trials. areas of left lateral prefrontal and
left lateral frontal cortex showed significant pattern discriminablity. Image
shown at MNI coordinates ( 38, 10, 44).
Figure C.6 Pattern stability of the di↵erence in willingness to pay and price
correlations, after taking out the main e↵ects of trial condition. The anterior
cingulate pattern is shown to be stable (i.e. anterior cingulate can cross-
decode WTP and price across charity and product decisions). Image shown
at MNI coordinates (1, 14, 18).
83
C.8 Figures
Figure C.1: Task Design
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Figure C.2: Behavioural data by condition
Figure C.3: cvMANOVA decision value in charity and product conditions
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Figure C.4: cvMANOVA di↵erential decision value between charity and prod-
uct conditions
Figure C.5: cvMANOVA main e↵ect of WTP vs price for both conditions
Figure C.6: cvMANOVA stability of WTP vs price across both conditions
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